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I. Introduction 
On June 12, 2016, the United States woke up to headlines of a massacre at the Pulse 
nightclub in Orlando. With 52 dead it became the largest mass shooting on US soil since the 
Virginia Tech Massacre in 2007. Omar Mateen, a Muslim man, claimed allegiance to ISIS and 
attacked a gay nightclub on latinx night with legally purchased, semi-automatic weapons, all 
during the most divisive presidential campaign season I had witnessed. It was a deeply complex, 
political, and at the time confusing, instance of mass violence that had the nation scrambling for 
explanations and solutions. 
At the time, I was working on ways to quantitatively capture political discourse on 
Twitter in relation to the coming election. I spent my days on Twitter exploring political 
conversations and observing the language Twitter users employed to tweet about issues. What 
language was in a tweet when a user tweeted about immigration? How nuanced and subtle can 
the language within a tweet be and still be recognizable as relating to an issue? I observed 
tweets, Twitter users, and the ecosystem of Twitter so we could begin to quantify the 
conversation. Yet, On June 12, Orlando became the top priority, and all other projects stalled. 
Orlando was going to be a huge moment in the election, it seemed, and we had to put all our 
efforts into capturing it. 
I observed Twitter looking for trends in language to best capture Orlando conversation. It 
was all Twitter users were talking about for days, but finding the patterns within the nuanced 
Tweets was different than any topics I had studied before. For rather than two frames defining 
the sides to an argument (pro-life/pro-choice, anti-immigration/pro-immigration), Twitter users 
offered many competing and intersecting frames. It was difficult to gauge what Twitter users 
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were talking about in relation to Orlando, for they developed many complex frames and argued 
for them with heavy emotions. It was difficult to measure what was the highest priority or the 
most salient frame. 
 
 
Of course the Orlando shooting incited heavy emotional responses and debate from the US and 
Twitter. Orlando acted as a focusing event. It shocked the public, and with that shock created 
fear and a desire to find a solution. But did all mass shootings look like this on social media? 
Each group framed Orlando in a way that identified the cause of the shooting and how to stop 
future shootings from happening, but they did it with panic in their tone and frantic, occasionally 
attacking language. How did frames function on Twitter after mass shootings? And how do they 
correlate with polarization on this platform? Do they exacerbate it? Create hostile environments? 
Or perhaps bring opposing groups together? Does this frantic, panicked sprint to frame and solve 
the issue lead to depolarization or larger consensus on Twitter? 
 
 
To explore these questions, I brought together my little experience in data analytics, machine 
learning, social media, and political science to create a method to observe what frames form on 
Twitter after a mass shooting, who argues what frames, and who shares information? In the first 
chapter, I break down the significance and history of framing and polarization. The second 
chapter dives into the method of my data collection and analysis. The next three chapters are 
case studies of mass shootings. In the final chapter, I consider the findings and implications of 
this work. 
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II. Framing and Polarization: A Literature Review 
Introduction 
In this thesis I analyze three mass shootings with different frames. Though each incident was 
violent and resulted in many deaths by similar if not by the same means, I expect that in the wake 
of each shooting, Twitter users will use language to frame the shootings differently. Then, based 
on my inclinations from working with on Orlando, I hope to explore the possibility that different 
frames of shootings correlate with polarity patterns of Twitter users. To explore this, I measure 
what topics frame the conversation after each shooting, and who is sending tweets that contribute 
to those topics. 
 
 
To give my work more context, I will briefly review and explain the relevance of framing and 
focusing events before diving into the different frames that are relevant to my case studies. I will 
explain polarization in the public sphere, and how I predict focusing events and more 
specifically, how they are framed, will correlate with polarization patterns on Twitter. 
 
Framing 
There is extensive work analyzing media framing of political issues as well as how that framing 
influences policy and public opinion over time.1 Entman defines framing as “the process of 
 
 
1Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. "Framing Theory." Annual Review of Political Science 10, no. 1 (2007): 
103-26. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054. 
Nelson, Thomas E., Oxley, Zoe M., Clawson, Rosalee A. “Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects.” Political 
Behavior 19, no 3 (1997): 221-246. doi:https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024834831093. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., Mahoney, Christine. “The Two Faces of Framing: Individual-Level Framing and Collective 
Issue Definition in the European Union.” European Union Politics 9, no 3 (2008): 435-449. Doi: 
10.1177/1465116508093492 
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culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights 
connections among them to promote a particular interpretation.”2 Frames guide the audience to 
interpret an issue in a certain way that generally promotes their agenda, be it political, economic, 
or social. They are often designed by a person in a position of power.3 Issues with multiple 
frames are controversial, and issues with almost opposite frames, polarizing.4 
 
For framing to be effective, the audience must be primed to absorb the narrative that is framed. 
Priming, or the act of increasing the importance and salience of specific aspects of the issue that 
is being framed, ensures that the public is focused on the issue and deems it not only worthy of 
their attention, but important and urgent enough that they have the responsibility to pay attention, 
be informed, and develop an opinion on the issue.5 The media can prime the audience to receive 
 
a frame by focusing an abnormal or extraordinary amount of attention on the issue at hand. The 
audience can also prime other members of the audience by continuously discussing one subject. 
These methods increase the issue’s perceived importance and relevance, and promotes more 
discussion of the subject, growing its salience. Once primed and searching to form an opinion, 
 
2 Entman, Robert M. "Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power." Journal of Communication 57, no. 1 
(2007): 163-73. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00336.x. 
3 Nelson, Thomas E., and Zoe M. Oxley. “Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion.” The Journal 
of Politics 61, no. 4, (1999): 1040–1067. doi:10.2307/2647553. 
4 Entman, “Framing Bias.” 
5D’Abrosio, Lisa, and Gross, Kimberly. “Framing Emotional Response.” Political Psychology 21, no. 1 (2004) doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00354.x 
Iyengar, Shanto, and Simon, Adam. “News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of 
Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing.” Sage Journals 20, no. 3 (1993): 365-383. Doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/009365093020003002 
Tewksbury, David, Vincent Price, and Elisabeth Powers. “Switching Trains of Though: The Impact of News Frames on Readers’ 
Cognitive Responses.” Communications Research 25, no. 5 (1997) doi:10.1177/009365097024005002 
Kim, Sei-Hill, D.A Scheufele and J. Shanahan. “Think About it This Way: Attribute Agenda-Setting Function of the Press and 
the Public’s Evaluation of a Local Issue.” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 79, no. 1 (2002) 
doi:10.1177/107769900207900102 
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the audience is influenced to see the issue through the frame.  
 
Fully developed framing performs four functions. First, the frame defines the problem.6 For 
example, in the wake of a mass shooting the problem is quite glaring, for shocking and violent 
deaths should not be a fear of any American citizen. Next, the framer performs a causal 
analysis.7 The cause can be identified as an issue of gun control, terrorism, immigration, crime, 
hate, or other factors. Third, the framer makes subtle or not-so-subtle moral judgments and 
massages his or her language to suggest that the frame chosen is morally correct.8  For example, 
gun rights and gun control both use language that suggests defense, such as “defend our 
constitutional right to bear arms” and “defend our lives and children by regulating guns.” The 
flip side of either frame then could read as “give everyone guns” and “restrict our freedoms.” A 
clearer example, perhaps, outside of the gun debate is in the classic pro-choice/pro-life binary 
in the reproductive health debate.9  Finally, the framer promotes a remedy that often contributes 
to a political agenda.10  
 
Often politicians or journalists, individuals with power and influence, develop frames. 
Journalists can frame topics in order to incite drama or excitement, with the intention of 
improving hits, supporting a politician, and so forth. A politician who is funded by a gun lobby 
can frame mass shootings to support his agenda. The refrain of the right, “the only way to stop a 
6 Entman, “Framing Bias.” 
7Ibid. 
8 Diakopoulos, Nicholas, Amy X. Zhang, and Andrew Salway. “Identifying and Analyzing Moral Evaluation Frames in Climate 
Change Blog Discourse.” Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, 
Ann Arbor, June 2014 
Entman, Robert. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 
(1993) doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x 
9 Diakopoulos, “Identifying and Analysing Moral Evaluation Frames.” 
10 Entman, “Framing Bias” 
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bad guy with a gun, is a good guy with a gun,” bolsters the Second Amendment and 
individual rights, suggesting that for a safer nation, we must ensure that there are enough 
guns to protect citizens. Not all framing is deceitful and negative, but it all builds a narrative 
that promotes an agenda, be the motivations altruistic or not. 
 
 
Boydstun et al. identify three main traits that are consistent across frames. First, they argue that 
the selected frames are “contingent on the institutional venue and political/economic context.”12 
Second, frames evolve over time in relation to the debate that surrounds the frame.13 For mass 
shootings, this trait is especially salient as the conversation is driven by a collective mourning in 
the first days after the event before quickly becoming politicized.14 Finally, frames spread, 
“contagion like,” throughout the public sphere, via social media, mass media, institutions, casual 




The audience proliferates frames through their social and formal networks.16  Of course, framing 
 
is not necessarily unidirectional. Journalists and politicians do not exclusively create frames that 





12Boydstun, Amber, Dallas Card, Justin H. Gross, Philip Resnik, Noah A. Smith, “Tracking the Development of 
Media Frames within and across Policy Issues.” Carnegie Mellon University Research Showcase (2014) 
13 Boydstun, “Tracking the Development of Media Frames” 
14 Barberá, Pablo, John T. Jost, Jonathan Nagler, Joshua A. Tucker, and Richard Bonneau. “Tweeting from Left to 
Right: Is Online Political Communication More Than an Echo Chamber?” Psychological Science 26 no. 10 (2015) 
doi: 10.1177/0956797615594620 
15 Boydstun, “Tracking the Development of Media Frames.” 
16 Entman, “Framing Bias.” 
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actors. Focusing events allow citizens “to observe and evaluate government in action” and 
critique it in a way that forces the government to adapt to the needs of the governed.17 
 
Curated and intentional language is the foundation of framing.18 And though the words may 
 
seem to have no inherent political meaning, “they attain meanings in their own historical and 
discursive settings through a long process of repetitive, selective, and careful usage within 
specific contexts.”19Natural language processing, it seems, can act as a useful tool to measure the 
 
salience of frames on social media, and I use it as a tool to measure the rates words occur in 
tweets and link those words to frames with long and political histories. 
 
 
I am concerned in this thesis primarily with the frames the audience latches onto and how 
different frames of mass shootings correlate with the polarization on Twitter. I recognize that 
social media is not contained in a vacuum, but rather interacts heavily with media, prominent 
figures, and other external influencers. For this reasons, I hope to not suggest that the frames 
shared on Twitter were organically formed by the Twitter user as if they received all of the 
important facts, and all of those facts presented in an unbiased way. Furthermore, because of 
Twitter users’ (and all humans) reputational fears and a desire to maintain or gain social capital, 
I hope to also not suggest that what we measure on Twitter is an accurate, inclusive, or  
17 Atkeson, Lonna Rae, and Cherie D. Maestas. Catastrophic Politics: How Extraordinary Events Redefine 
Perceptions of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2012. 
Newman, Benjamin and Todd Hartman, “Mass Shootings and Public Support for Gun Control.” British Journal for Political 
Science doi:10.1017/S0007123417000333 
18 Boydstun, “Tracking the Development of Media Frames.” 
19 Morin, Aysel. “Framing Terror: Strategies Newspapers Use to Frame an Act as Terror or Crime.” Journalism and Mass 
Communication Quarterly 93 no. 4 (2016) doi:10.1177/1077699016660720 
Jackson, Richard. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-terrorism. Manchester, UK: University of 
Manchester Press, 2005. 
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complete representation of  public opinion. I am simply identifying the frames on Twitter. For 
future work, I hope to continue to analyze how frames are born in the wake of mass shootings 
on different media and how they travel and influence one another. For now, I will focus 
primarily on identifying the frames that form around mass shootings on Twitter after a shooting 
and how they correlate with polarization in the Twittersphere over time. 
 
Focusing Events 
In this study I observe the frames applied to focusing events specifically through case studies. 
Focusing events are unique in the political sphere, for they are “sudden shocks” to the political 
system that can lead to policy change and affect mass polarization.20  Focusing events unveil an 
 
issue that might have been hidden before, a policy or regulation flaw, security risk, etc. and must 
increase (almost always negative)21 attention around a public issue yielding in political debate.22 
A focusing event is “sudden, relatively rare, reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the 
possibility of potentially greater future harms, inflicts harms or suggests potential harms that are 
or could be concentrated on a definable geographical area or community of interest, and that is 










20 Birkland, Thomas. “Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting.” Journal of Public Policy 18, no.1 
(1998) 
Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Harper Collins College Publishers. 1995. 
21 Baumgartner, Frank and Bryan Jones. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. University of Chicago Press. 
1993. 
22 Birkland, “Focusing Events.” and Baumgartner, Agendas and Instability in American Politics. 
23 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 
Birkland, “Focusing Events.” 
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Research shows that violent, man-made and natural tragedies such as the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy,24  Hurricane Katrina,25  and the 9/11 terrorist attacks26  all act as 
focusing events, for they “highlight the need for legislative action by providing a stark example 
of why a particular policy proved ineffectual or out of line with public opinion.” 27 Distant 
threats, threats to the nation, and personal threats or displays of vulnerability can all be focusing 
events, but they are received differently and carry different weights based on the audience's 
proximity to the event.28 
 
 
For this paper, my case studies are three mass shootings that act as focusing events for an array 
of social problems as a single individual inflicts death on a mass scale. For this reason, mass 
shootings have a different influence on public discourse, policy, and public opinion than 
something such as the assassination of JFK or Hurricane Katrina. The perceived risk is greater in 
instances of mass, sudden, man-caused death than in a single death or in natural disasters, which 
cultivates panic and a different form of debate. My work draws no conclusions on perceived risk 
after each focusing event, but does show aspects of each mass shooting that correlate with 











24 Sears 1965; Sheatsley and Feldman 1964; Sheatsley and Feldman 1965. 
25 Atkeson and Maestas 2012; Huddy and Feldman 2006. 
26 Huddy and Feldman 2011; Jacobson 2007; Smith, Rasinski, and Toce 2001; Traugott et al. 2002 
27 Birkland, “Focusing Events.” 
28 Newman, “Mass Shootings and Public Support for Gun Control.” 
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Frames in Case Studies 
Mass shootings are framed by a variety of narratives depending on the context of the shooting 




Many of these frames are not mutually exclusive. For example, some of the frames I outline 
below bleed into each other, and others such as the Security/Gun Rights frame are completely 
inseparable from one another and act as one frame. I have organized the frames to have a sort of 
tree structure where one frame feeds others. For example, below I outline Terrorism, War on 
Terror/Islamic Terrorism, and Domestic Terrorism. Terrorism is the trunk that supports the 
smaller branches of War on Terror/Islamic Terrorism and Domestic Terrorism. Any frame that is 
a War on Terror/Islamic Terrorism frame or a Domestic Terrorism frame is also a Terrorism 
frame. However, not all Terrorism frames act as War on Terror/Islamic Terrorism or Domestic 
Terrorism frames. I will break this concept down further in my Methods chapter when I discuss 
topics and how topics fit into the following frames. 
 
Terrorism 
Arguably the frame in this study with the most deep and political history is Terrorism. There is 
no single, universally-accepted definition of terrorism. For example, the US Patriot Act of 2001 
and the FBI have definitions of terrorism that do not align. The US Patriot Act defines terrorism 
as “any crime committed with the use of any weapon or dangerous device," when the intent of 
the crime is determined to be the endangerment of public safety or substantial property damage 
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rather than for "mere personal monetary gain,” while the FBI and Department of Defence require 
political coercion for a violent act to be defined as a terrorist act.29 States define terrorism 
differently as well, for mass violence is the only prerequisite for an act to be a terrorist act in 
Nevada.30 Furthermore, the word “terrorism” is often used as an attention grabber by politicians 
or the media to draw attention and cause fear,31 framing it as more scary than a mere crime. 
 
 
Miller argues that “terrorism and the media are entwined in an almost inexorable, symbiotic 
relationship”—the media are drawn to the nature of the shock of a terror story and the revenue it 
promises, and terror is dependent on the media’s proliferation of terrorist content. Ahmed writes, 
“Maximum impact of an act of terrorism comes from the widespread media coverage, which 
creates a climate of fear among the population, focusing government attention, economic 
resources, and military resources on fighting a ‘War on Terror.’”32 Though Ahmed specifically 
 
focuses on the War on Terror, his claim is more general. Terror relies heavily on the media, and 










29 “Terrorism” FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism. 
“How the US Patriot Act Redefines Domestic Terrorism” ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-domestic-terrorism. 
“The US Patriot Act, Preserving Life and Liberty” Justice.gov, https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm. 
30 “Nevada Revised Statutes, “Act of Terrorism” defined” Justia US Law. 
https://law.justia.com/codes/nevada/2015/chapter-202/statute-202.4415/ 
31 RETURN TO 
32 Ahmed, Shamilia. “The ‘Emotionalization of the “War on Terror”’: Counter-terrorism, Fear, Risk, Insecurity and 
Helplessness.” Criminology and Criminal Justice 15, no. 5 (2015). 
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Terrorism can encapsulate each of our three case studies. However, the Terrorism frame has 
many layers. For instance, a terrorist act could be one of Domestic Terrorism, International 
Terrorism, Radical Leftist Terrorism, Radical Islamic Terrorism, and so forth. Yet, regardless of 
the type of terrorism, the language of terrorism always incites a different reaction than language 
of Crime in the US.33  So, to try to capture when an issue is framed as any kind of terror attack, I 
 
created the broad topic of Terrorism. It classifies a tweet as relating to Terrorism whenever it 
uses language such as “terrorist” or “terrorism.” Then, to capture the nuances of terrorism, I 
created more granular terrorism topics as well such as Domestic Terrorism and Radical Islamic 
Terrorism to identify if the tweet can fit into a granular, specific form of terrorism. 
 
Domestic Terrorism 
Domestic Terrorism, or homegrown terrorism, is any act of terrorism on a country committed by 
someone who shares the same citizenship as the victims rather than by some international 
organization. Mass shootings are often framed as acts of Domestic Terrorism when the shooter 
expresses clear political motives but is an American, often from the radical political left or the 
radical political right. For example, violent acts committed by the Environmental Liberation 
Front are often defined and framed as acts of Domestic Terrorism.34 This frame is usually used in 
 
clear cut cases of explicit politically-motivated violence rather than mass violence. Framers often 
look to federal law to define terrorism and are hesitant to use language of terrorism if there is not 





33 Ahmed, “The Emotionalization of the ‘War on Terror’” 
34 “The Threat of Eco-Terrorism” Archives, the FBI.gov, 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-threat-of-eco-terrorism. 
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War on Terror/Islamic Terrorism 
In the US, terrorism has become almost synonymous with Islamic Terrorism. The government 
has built the Islamic Terrorism frame and narrative around 9/11, and conflict between the US and 
Iraq or the Middle East more generally acts as the foundation for this frame.35 The repetition of 
 
the tight juxtaposition of Islam and terror has lead Americans, whether they be government 
officials, journalists, or everyday citizens to see a relationship and causal connection between 
Islam and terror that is not based in logic, but is rather an emotional and affective response. 
 
 
Reese and Lewis argued that the press and media internalized the government’s focus on the link 
between Islam and terror.36 The media framed terror attacks as within the “War on Terror,” and 
juxtaposed images terror attacks with Islam so the audience saw a direct relationship between the 
two.37 Curated to elicit a powerful emotional and affective response, these images guide the 
audience to entangle terrorism and Islam so closely and deeply that they believe terrorism and 
Islam go hand in hand. After 9/11, rhetoric such as this lead to the invasion of Iraq and the new 
beginning of an “Us versus Them, or the United States versus Islam that created animosity 
between East and West.”38This language and imagery cultivated a new fear of Muslim terrorists 
 
from a fear of terrorism. Terror has become synonymous to Muslim violence. Powell explains, 
“coverage of those terrorist events revealed a pattern of media coverage of terrorism in which 
 
 
35Lewis, S. C., & Reese, S. D. “Framing the War on Terror: The internalization of policy in the US press.” 
Journalism 10, no. 6 (2009). 
36 Lewis, S. C., & Reese, S. D. ("What is war on terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists.” 
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 86, no. 1. (2009) doi:10.1177/107769900908600106 
37Powell, Kimberly. “Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism Since 9/11.” Communication Studies 62, 
no. 1 (2011) doi:10.1080/10510974.2011.533599 
38Powell, “Framing Islam.” 
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fear of international terrorism is dominant, particularly as Muslims/Arabs/Islam working 
together in organized terrorist cells against a ‘Christian America,’ while domestic terrorism is 
cast as a minor threat that occurs in isolated incidents by troubled individuals.”39 
Jackson breaks down how the Radical Islamic Terrorism frame is constructed: (a) define the 
attacks as exceptional tragedies and assigned America a victim status; (b) construct them as acts 
of war rather than as crimes or mass murders; (c) describe them in ways that allow them to fit 
into other preexisting popular meta-narratives, such as the Pearl Harbor attack; and (d) construct 
them as national attacks as opposed to local (New York) violence.40With this frame, the audience 
 
supports drastic and aggressive measures, such as the war with Iraq and the Muslim travel ban. 
This is the most common and specific Terrorism frame. 
 
Hate Crime 
Our final terror frame is the Hate Crime frame. A hate crime is an often violent crime motivated 
by racial, sexual, or other forms of prejudice.41Many acts of terror are performed with the intent 
of gaining an audience’s attention, often a government, and the victims of the physical act are 
arbitrarily chosen to best suit the main goal. Hate crimes, however, are usually inflicted upon the 
groups they hope to influence rather than a random victim, and they hope inflict fear and harm a 
group because of their race, religion, and so forth. 
 
 
Perhaps the most prevalent form of terror in the United States and the least documented, the 
history of hate crimes in the US is dark and hidden. The FBI, in an attempt to accurately gauge 
 
39 Powell, Framing Islam.” 
40 Jackson, Writing the War on Terror. 
41 “Hate Crime Laws” Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/crt/hate-crime-laws. 
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the frequency of hate crimes in the US, has begun measuring the annual occurrence of hate 
crimes by state and city. However, the data is given voluntarily. States that are good about 
reporting their rates, such as California and New Jersey, report many hate crimes annually.42 
Still, often in the deep south, states report zero hate crimes per year.43 States hide hate crimes, 
and some, like South Carolina, have no hate crime laws.44 
 
Overall, observing the pattern, the public is often hesitant to explicitly talk about hate crimes, 
explicitly argue the frame of Hate Crime, or admit the attack was a Hate Crime and motivated by 
racism, homophobia, and so forth. However, in this study, if tweets reference racism, 




The immigration frame is simple and is only applied to shooters who are either first-generation 
immigrants or whose family is. The only shooting that is framed in terms of immigration in this 
study is the Orlando shooting, for Omar Mateen’s parents immigrated from Afghanistan. And 
although Mateen was born in the United States, many blamed the US’s immigration policies for 
the mass shooting. However, this frame is intimately linked with the War on Terror/Islamic 
Terrorism frame, for if his family had not immigrated from a Middle Eastern or Muslim 
country, perhaps the frame would not have been prominent. Furthermore, because Trump 
devoted much of his campaign to immigration policy, the frame was bolstered further. 
42 Hailey Middlebrook, “The fascinating, if unreliable, history of hate crime tracking in the US” CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/05/health/hate-crimes-tracking-history-fbi/index.html. 
43Middlebrook, “Hate Crime Tracking in the US” 
44Middlebrook, “Hate Crime Tracking in the US” 
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However, immigration is never a major frame within these shootings. 
 
Crime 
Some scholars have identified the crime frame as the counter to the Terrorism frame. For 
instance, in a study directly comparing the Ft. Hood shooting and the DC Navy Yard shooting, 
two mass shootings at similar locations, where military personnel died, Aysel Morin found them 
to be framed completely differently. Morin argues that Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Ft. Hood 
shooter, was labelled an Islamic terrorist while Aaron Alexis, the DC Navy Yard shooter, was 
deemed a criminal.45  Yet rather than analyzing the framing of the Alexis shooting as “Crime,” 
Morin focuses on other, more granular frames that I classify through topics like Mental Health.46 
Because I have made topics for the more granular frames rather than the large, Crime frame, 
crime language rarely registers in my classifiers. Rather, the frames that compose this crime 
frame, such as Mental Illness, register. 
 
Gun Control 
Gun control, often a frame born from the political left, defines the problem displayed in mass 
shootings as the accessibility of guns in the United States. This frame explains that guns, 
especially semi-automatic such as AR-15s, the type of weapon most commonly used in mass 
shootings, are only useful for violence and murder. This frame implies that without access to 





45  Morin, “Framing Terror.” 
46  Morin, “Framing Terror.” 
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mass shootings. The Left offers the solution of more gun control to save lives and prevent mass 
shooting in the future. 
 
Security/Gun Rights 
The political right recognizes that unjustified deaths from mass shootings are a problem, but to 
counter the Gun Control argument, they explain that there are not enough guns distributed 
among the public to prevent mass shootings. Within the Security frame, their refrain, “guns don’t 
kill people, people kill people” suggests that there will always be people who want to commit 
these mass murders.47 This frame is often tied tightly with the Mental Health frame, suggesting 
 
that there are always going to be those who are mentally ill and violent who will commit murder. 
Regulation, they explain, will not stop someone who is determined to commit a mass shooting 
from getting a gun illegally. Rather, they suggest that a “good guy with a gun” is the only way to 
stop a “bad guy with a gun.”48  Their solution is to arm teachers, pastors, and so forth. While 
 




Gun Rights correlates strongly with this frame. The Gun Rights frame generally is reactionary to 
the Gun Control frame. Many, predominantly on the Right, recognize the Left’s response to mass 
shootings as strict gun control. The gun rights advocates feel as if their second amendment rights 





47 “Michael Moore: ‘Guns don’t kill people, Americans kill people’” Fox News Entertainment, 
http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2013/11/06/michael-moore-guns-dont-kill-people-americans-kill-people.ht 
ml. 
48 “I believe that the only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun, is a good guy with a gun.” Fox News, 
https://twitter.com/foxnews/status/983299745195216897?lang=en 
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them to become so entangled in the “good guy with a gun” rhetoric that they are impossible to 
separate. Therefore, I have merged the Security and Gun Rights frames into one frame. 
 
Mental Health 
Another frame that is often linked with the Security frame is the Mental Health frame. In the 
words of Metzl and MacLeish who break down mental illness, mass shootings, and the politics 
of firearms, those who frame mass shootings as a Mental Health issue suggest that (1) mental 
illness causes gun violence, (2) psychiatric diagnosis can predict gun crime, (3) shootings 
represent the deranged act of mentally ill loners, and (4) that gun control will not prevent mass 
shootings.49  In instances where a gunman has shown no prior mental health illness, the framers 
 
suggest that the shooter must have had a mental health “break” or was moving through life 
undiagnosed. In cases where the shooter was diagnosed, the blame of the mass shooting falls 
completely on that illness. They suggest that if someone who is mentally ill decides to commit a 
mass shooting, nothing could prevent it. 
 
 
Sometimes associated with this frame is the claim that US culture is to blame for the 
perpetrator’s violence. Some who use this frame suggest that violence in media, violent movies, 











49Metzl, Jonathan M. and Kenneth T. MacLeish. “Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics of American 
Firearms.” American Public Health Association 105, no. 2 (2015). doi:10.2105/AJPH.2014.302242 
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Thoughts and Prayers 
 
Here is an example tweet that I will reference again in the Charleston chapter. @mikachu247 
shared her disgust for the Charleston shooting. And though expressing disgust could be seen as a 
political act in itself, I do not classify it as such, for almost all Twitter users expressed sadness 
and grief at these events. This tweet received no classification. 
 
However, I do classify Thoughts and Prayers as political and have made it a topic and frame. The 
language of Thoughts and Prayers is active, an explicit expression of hopefulness and 
condolences towards, most generally, the victims and all those affected. This active engagement 
with the event is in contrast with those who simply speak about the event and their distaste for it. 
Furthermore, there is a history of political actors, media outlets, and the general public 
responding to mass shootings with “thoughts and prayers” that has created its own political 
discourse. For example, on Twitter, in academia, and in mass media, a typical response to a 
politician tweeting something like, “Our thoughts and prayers are for the victims of today’s 




Joe Garofoli. “Trump tweets ‘thoughts and prayers’for YouTube shooting victims.” SFGate, 
https://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Trump-tweets-thoughts-and-prayers-for-12803165.php. 
Blair Guild. “Trump tweets condolences to wrong town after mass shooting.” CBS News, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-tweets-condolences-to-wrong-town-after-mass-shooting/, 
Lisa Moraes. “Donald Trump Tweets “Warmest Condolences and Sympathies to Victims… Of Terrible Las Vegas 
Shooting” Deadline.com, http://deadline.com/2017/10/donald-trump-las-vegas-shooting-tweet-eric-1202180329/. 
51“Living ‘Woke’: When Thoughts and Prayers Aren’t Enough” 
Marke Leibovich, “Do Politicians’ Thoughts and Prayers Mean Anything?” The New York Times Magazine, 
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Case Studies 
I have chosen the following as case studies: the Charleston Church Shooting, the Orlando Pulse 
Nightclub Shooting, and the Las Vegas Shooting. To choose my case studies, I first pulled 
together a pool of mass shootings. I classified a mass shooting as any shooting that resulted in 3 
or more deaths in the US. Next, the shooting needed to actually act as a national focusing event. 
Events that were impactful locally would not bring in constructive or useful data from Twitter 
with the method used. To be a national focusing event, it had to be seen as nationally significant, 
and shocking, and the event had to take up major time and space on media outlets. In order for 
the data to be meaningful, I chose events that, most likely, many Twitter users had exposure to. 
This way, if the data showed that people tweeted less after one shooting than another, it would 
not be a question of whether the Twitter users knew that the shooting happened or had exposure 




Next, I looked at the media and government’s framing of each shooting. For the sake of this 
study, I wanted shootings that had all different frames. However, they had to be close in time to 
one another. For example, to compare a shooting from 2009 with one from 2015 would have 
distorted results, for Twitter has grown significantly between those years and the results would 
not be comparable with so few case studies. Similarity in impact was also important. A 
shooting that killed few is not easily comparable to a shooting that killed many. Yet, impact is a 
difficult measure, for a shooting that killed few could be just as large a focusing event as one 
that killed many depending on how shocking or how the media and government portrays
Hughes 24  
it. For this reason I included Charleston. Framed as a hate crime, it was comparable in media 
significance to the other two even though fewer died in that attack than Vegas or Orlando. For 
these reasons and in order to observe frames on Twitter, I chose these three shootings for their 
differences which promised some variance of frames and polarization across shootings. 
 
Polarization 
In this study, I hope to observe how the different frames of each shooting correlate with the level 
of political polarization on Twitter in the two weeks after the shooting. Cass R. Sunstein explains 
in “The Law of Group Polarization” that individuals naturally gravitate towards others with 
whom they identify and form groups. Even on platforms like Twitter, a platform that has little 
structure or regulation, people gravitate towards those who perhaps have similar opinions, 
experiences, senses of humor, or in this case, political opinions. Once roughly formed, groups 
self select to become more homogenous. Members of that group “follow” those who are similar, 
and their feed gradually becomes homogeneous as they filter out and “unfollow” those who are 
do not conform to the group. Their feed, then, reflects ideas and arguments in-line with the 
group’s ideology. Gradually, members shift closer together and become more loyal to that group. 
They conform to one another. Yet, when multiple groups develop around opposing ideologies of 
the same debate, they begin to define themselves in opposition to the other group. As a result, 
the group moves further away from the opposition. They polarize as a result, and members of the 
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group move towards an extreme.52 The extreme point they gravitate towards is generally in 
whatever direction they leaned towards already.53 
 
Sunstein identifies two principal mechanisms underlying group polarization: social influences 
on behavior, and cascades. Social influences on behavior reflect the tendency for people to 
believe and do what they think other relevant people believe and do. For example, when 
someone expresses their opinion on Twitter, there is an external informational component that 
directs others within that group, saying that they should have this opinion too. Observers 
receive a signal about what makes sense to believe or do when they watch those they respect 
express their beliefs.54 For example, if I followed a politician because I valued their stance on 
 
abortion and respected their opinion, and if they offered another opinion on a different subject, 
say immigration, I would be more inclined to form that similar opinion because I already 
respected and valued their voice. This trend pushes groups to become homogenous not around 
just one position, but many.55 Within the groups, conformity dominates, and the majority of 
individuals hope to be just like the people they deem relevant and important.56 
 
The second mechanism, although not always present or necessary in group polarization, is 
informational and reputational cascades. When someone in a group is unsure, if they do not have 
a concrete opinion formed on an issue, they do not know what action to take, or they feel they do 
 
 
52Sunstein, Cass R. “The Law of Group Polarization.” Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 
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not know enough about an issue, they rely on “information provided by the statements or actions 
of others.”57 Sunstein gives the following example from Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt’s study 
of information cascades about toxic waste dumps: 
 
If A is unaware whether abandoned toxic waste dumps are in fact hazardous, he may be 
moved in the direction of fear if B seems to think that fear is justified. If A and B believe 
that fear is justified, C may end up thinking so too, at least if she lacks independent 
information to the contrary. If A, B, and C believe that abandoned hazardous waste dumps 
are hazardous, D will have to have a good deal of confidence to reject their shared 
conclusion. 58 
The result of this process, they explain, “can be to produce cascade effects, as large groups of 
people end up believing something - even if that something is false simply because other people 
seem to believe it too.” 59 Within the groups that participate in polarization, local conformity 
 
plays a massive role, to the point where the entire group will believe the same things whether 
they are true or not, and take the same actions for informational or reputational reasons. As 
Sunstein explains, “like polarized molecules, group members become even more aligned in the 











58Anderson, Lisa R. and Charles A. Hold. “Information Cascades in the Laboratory.” The American Economic 
Review 87, no. 5 (1997) 
59Ibid, 
60 Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization.” 
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Many factors play into this gradual shift towards the extreme. Social comparison, similar to 
reputational social influences, play a key role. People want to be perceived positively and to 
perceive themselves positively by those they deem relevant, who often are in their group.61 When 
 
they observe what others in the group believe and how they act, they compare themselves to 
them. Then, they move towards the dominant position, which in turn, shifts the entire group 
towards a more extreme view. The point of reference has shifted from the middle of all groups, 
from the political moderate, to the middle of one’s respective group. And, when one compares 
themselves to an external group and defines themselves in terms of that external group (in the 
case of political parties), polarization increase.62 
 
Personal factors play into an individual’s probability of taking part in group polarization. The 
more politically literate an individual is, the more likely they are to push towards the extreme 
ends.63 One common sense piece of polarization is that those with the most persuasive arguments 
 
bring others into their groups. Individuals perceive those who state their views with a “high 
degree of confidence” or have novel arguments to be more convincing.64 Conversely, when an 
issue has been in the public eye and discussed extensively for a long period of time, opinion 
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Mass shootings seem to be distinctive as focusing events. Barbera, in his piece, “Tweeting from 
Left to Right”, analyzed Twitter discourse on twelve issues: six that he deemed political, six 
coded as non-political. He found that nonpolitical events such as the Super Bowl and Oscars 
were depolarized, with Twitter users interacting across party lines.66 In comparison, on events 
 
such as elections, Twitter users were highly polarized. The Newtown shooting proved distinct 
from both that of the standard political and non-political events: It started out highly depolarized, 
but polarized over time as the conversation turned from mourning to a political debate.67 
 
Discussion around US intervention in Syria produced the reverse pattern, at first highly 
politicized but then depolarizing over time.68 
 
Social influences and cascades shift because of focusing events,69 suggesting that polarization 
could end or reverse in light of new and shocking information given to the public through the 
framing of focusing events.70 Mass shootings are focusing events that dominate mass media, 
legislatures, and the public’s attention for extended periods of time. Do they have common 
patterns of Twitter discourse? And are the ways in which they are framed correlate either with 
polarization or depolarization? These are the central questions I investigate in this thesis. In the 
next chapter I explain the processes of gathering and analysing the Twitter data to observe 
frames on Twitter. 
 
66Barberá, Pablo, John T. Jost, Jonathan Nagler, Joshua A. Tucker, and Richard Bonneau. “Tweeting from Left to 
Right: Is Online Political Communication More Than an Echo Chamber?” Psychological Science 26 no. 
10 (2015) doi: 10.1177/0956797615594620 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid 
69Hirshleifer, David A., The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads and Informational Cascades. The New 
Economics of Human Behavior, Ierulli, K. and Tommasi, M., eds., Ch.12, pp. 188-215, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995; Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA, Working Paper No. 24-93. 
70 Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization” 





The Media Lab 
The Media Lab of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology designs technologies with the 
intention of aiding humans to create a better future. Within the Media Lab, the Laboratory for 
Social Machines (LSM) develops data science methods to analyze societal trends for positive 
social impact. Using natural language processing, network science, and machine learning, the 
group maps the intersection of news, entertainment, and media nationally to better understand 
the interaction of media and behavior. A partnership between Twitter and LMS sparked the 
project, Electome, which tracked the news and social media discussion around the 2016 
presidential campaigns. The Lab’s exclusive access to Twitter’s firehose, every historical and 
real-time tweet, gave the group the opportunity to develop a machine learning algorithm to label 
individual tweets and accounts based on topic and tone. From this data, LSM has mapped the 




To break down Twitter’s firehose into those component parts, the tweets must pass through a 
processing pipeline. The pipeline ingests all real time tweets and passes them through text 




71"Fueling the Horse Race of Ideas in the 2016 Election." Laboratory for Social Machines. Accessed November 23, 
2017. http://socialmachines.media.mit.edu/2015/10/29/fueling-the-horse-race-of-ideas-3/. 
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be classified.72  My project takes the algorithms developed for Electome, removes them from the 
 
2016 campaign discussion, and applies them to man-made tragedies, or mass shootings. For 
this project, I collected historic tweets and collected data the day of and the two weeks after 
each event, Orlando (June 12, 2016 - June 26, 2016), Charleston (June 17, 2015 - July 1, 




To find frames on Twitter, recognize who is arguing these frames, and observe the polarization 
patterns associated with the frames, my analysis then must answer a series of questions: 1) What 
is each tweet about and who is tweeting it? 2) Who is tweeting articles, what articles are they 
sharing, and in what networks? 3) How much of the discourse is isolated? In this chapter, I will 
explain the methods I’ve used to try to answer these questions. First, I identify what each tweet is 
about by building topic classifiers. Next, I identify who is tweeting by classifying Twitter users 
by demographic attributes. Then, I identify what articles are shared on Twitter and by whom. To 
identify frames, I use the tweet classifier to quantitatively measure what is dominating the 
conversation for each of the demographics identified by the ideology classifier. To give the 
frames context, I look at other topics that correlate with the frame, but do not dominate the 
conversation. I find groups that form by the urls they share and observe how they polarize. After 
aggregating the data to a digestible form, I am able to measure the volume of tweets. I then can 




72 Vijayaraghavan, Prashanth, Soroush Vosoughi, and Deb Roy. "Automatic Detection and Categorization of 
Election-Related Tweets." In Proceedings of the 10th International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, 
2016. 





Twitter estimates that there are more than half a billion tweets sent out daily. To classify and 
collect relevant tweets about an event, each individual tweet must be sifted through a series of 
text processing models and filtered into a specific bucket.73 In order to capture almost all tweets 
 
relating to each event, I made event-specific classifiers using a precise list of mass shooting seed 
terms. These lists included event-specific terms including hashtags, single words, and phrases 
(e.g., #orlandoshooting, #pulsenightclubshooting, “pulse night club”) as well as the names of 
those involved, including victims and perpetrators. We also included if-then statements of the 
name of the location along with shooting terms (e.g., if both orlando and shooting).74 
 
 
Next, after being classified as relating to a specific shooting, each tweet is sifted through a series 
of text processing models to identify the topic of the tweet.75 To label the tweet with a topic, I 
made another series of topic classifiers using a list of terms. For example, the topic Gun Rights 
includes terms such as “2A” and #endgunviolence. I chose a list of topics that were often used in 
discussions surrounding the shootings the week after the shooting. The topics include Gun 









73 Vijayaraghavan, Prashanth, Soroush Vosoughi, and Deb Roy. (2016) 
74 Vijayaraghavan, Prashanth, Soroush Vosoughi, and Deb Roy. (2016) 
75 Vijayaraghavan, Prashanth, Soroush Vosoughi, and Deb Roy. (2016) 
76 Tribalism in the Twittersphere 
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Granularity of Topics 
Topics as broad as I’ve outlined above (Gun Issues, LGBTQ Issues, Terror, etc.), naturally have 
many layers and component parts. Many tweets about a mass shooting reference Gun Issues, and 
those tweets fall into the Gun Issues bucket. However, when we break the topics down into their 
component parts, or subtopics, we can identify what tweets are referencing more specifically in 
relation to the shooting. Within the topic Gun Issues, I created subtopics ranging from policy 
issues, such as Gun Laws and Second Amendment Rights (#2A, “second amendment”, 
#gunrights, etc.) to the objects themselves in Weapons (“gun(s)”, “rifle(s)”, “semiautomatic”, 
etc.). I did the same for the other topics as well, though some have more subtopics than others. 
By developing these subtopics, we created a filter that labels a tweet and drops it into a bucket 
granular enough that we can identify what specifically a twitter user chooses to comment on after 




Shortfalls of the Topic Model 
 
Tweets often have multiple topics. For instance, a tweet about Orlando can reference Gun Issues, 
LGBTQ Issues, and Terror: “I’ll never forget he blamed guns, instead of calling the Orlando 
shooting a radical Islamic attack on the #LGBTQ.” When the machine takes in a tweet, it 
identifies the probability a single tweet is about a certain topic. However, many tweets touch on 
multiple topics. For instance, the machine could identify that a tweet is about Terrorism, the 
Second Amendment, and Hillary Clinton. In that instance, the tweet would be counted towards 
every subtopic once, making it count multiple times. For this reason, the volume of all tweets 
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after a shooting appears smaller than the volume of all topic classified tweets. I made the 




In a similar fashion to the topic classifiers, our demographic classifier recognizes patterns within 
Twitter and drops accounts that fit these patterns into demographic buckets.77 Our demographic 
classifier can identify a user’s gender, age, political orientation, and location.78 An account will 
be classified as either male or female, younger than thirty, between thirty and sixty, or older than 
60 years old, left or right leaning, and living in one of four regions in the US.79 However, for  
this project, I classify only political ideology. 
 
 
Just like the topic classifier, the demographic classifier will label an account with “none” if it 
cannot identify the account’s demographic. The machine cannot identify a user if there is not 
enough information or the identity does not fit cleanly into any bucket. For example, regarding 
an account’s political ideology, the account would be labeled “none” if the machine cannot 
classify it, suggesting it is not a politically active account or it is moderate and doesn’t fit into 







77 Vijayaraghavan, Prashanth, Soroush Vosoughi, and Deb Roy. "Twitter Demographic Classification Using Deep 
Multi-modal Multi-task Learning." In Proceedings of the 55th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational 
Linguistics. Vancouver, Canada, 2017. 
78 Vijayaraghavan, Prashanth, Soroush Vosoughi, and Deb Roy. (2017) 
79 Vijayaraghavan, Prashanth, Soroush Vosoughi, and Deb Roy. (2017) 
80 Vijayaraghavan, Prashanth, Soroush Vosoughi, and Deb Roy. (2017) 
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Tweet History and Manual Political Ideology Classification 
 
The demographic classifier observes each account’s tweet history to identify political orientation. 
Three politically literate individuals manually annotated a list of 1000 Twitter accounts. 
Journalists, celebrities, politicians, companies and so forth were excluded from the list to attempt 
to accurately represent the average Twitter user. We labeled each account’s political ideology on 
a 5 point scale, 1 for the most liberal, 3 for moderate, and 5 for the most conservative accounts. 
To accurately determine each account’s political ideology, we read at least the most recent 100 
tweets from each account. Based on their opinions on different partisan issues both economic 
and social (such as healthcare, taxes, welfare, immigration, racial issues, and so forth) we 
estimated their ideological stance. 
 
 
With this annotation, in a similar manner as the topic models, we trained the machine to identify 
and learn from the language patterns of each account. From this baseline 1000 accounts, the 
machine learned to identify the political ideology of active, politically engaged accounts on 
Twitter. Spam accounts or accounts that do not participate politically at all or rarely are excluded 
from this group. For purposes of accuracy, we simplified the machine’s findings to a binary 
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system. The nuances of a ideological spectrum were lost when labelling accounts. However, the 
machine accurately identifies if an account is right or left leaning, or if an account is 
“unknown,” suggesting it is either moderate or did not offer enough information for the 
machine to identify it.81 
 
URL Classification 
In order to annotate and understand what is happening on Twitter during the two weeks after the 
shooting, I needed to give the tweets context. I needed to see what news had been released, be it 
policy related, new information about the shooter, or law enforcement reports in short time 
increments. Given the nature of these events, the tweets in the hours and days after the event 
changed hour by hour. Similarly, mass media reports of the events evolved rapidly and changed 
direction many times after some shootings. Articles reflecting on the event but written months or 
years after the event do not capture this frantic tone. To get an accurate vision of what the 
environment was like on social media the two weeks after a shooting, I had to identify, classify, 
and analyze the articles that were shared on Twitter over time in brief increments. 
 
URL Scraping 
After all tweets pass through the initial shooting filter and are dropped into the shooting buckets, 
we scrape them for URLs. “Scraping” text online means we deploy code that reads the text and 
searches for designated targets, like language patterns or symbols, and store them on a file to be 
analyzed. Scraping can be used to count the number of times a single word, a phrase, or piece of 
punctuation occurs in all articles from a source. The source could be a news provider’s archives, 
academic articles published online, and so forth. This system is easily translated to our Twitter  
 
81 Tribalism in the Twittersphere 
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data and can scrape tweet text. We used a scraper that targets URLs within tweets. Then, we 
pulled all the tweets with URLs and observed them independently from tweets without URLs. 
Though we looked at URL containing tweets independently from each mass shooting tweet 
bucket, we did not exclude them from our analysis of all tweets relating to that shooting. Rather, 
we identified tweets with URLs, observed and analyzed them separately from tweets, and then 




After we isolated the URL-containing tweets, we began to classify the URLs within the tweets. 
First, we recognized that many URLs were not sharing information we could digest at a large 
scale. For instance, many URLs were links to images or videos. In this project, I did not 
incorporate any imaging processing. Though images such as memes and photographs of events 
hold a lot of information, language is both more informative and easily processable at large 
scales. Research shows that conservative social media users use video to express their opinion 
and sight sources more than liberal users, so this is a bias in my data that should be kept in mind. 
Furthermore, we excluded urls that began with: twitter.com, facebook.com, youtube.com, 
linkis.com, google.com, and dmm.com. These link lead to other social media statuses, videos, or 
content that we chose not to include in this analysis. When pulling urls, we hoped that they 
would hold information relevant to the shooting from some verified or legitimate information 
source. 
 
Once the URL-containing tweets were pulled, we broke down the URL to label the tweet with a 
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source and an article headline. For instance, if the Tweet shared this URL: 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/06/18/orlando-massacre-prompts-some-in-lgbt-communit 
y-to-come-out-for-trump.html, we would automatically identify that it was from Fox News and 
that the headline was, “Orlando Massacre Prompts Some in LGBT Community to Come Out for 
Trump.” At this point, I manually classified each article. I took into account the source and its 
historical patterns of being liberal or conservative, as well as the article itself and how strongly it 
leaned left or right. 
 
 
Next, we rated the articles based on the number of shares per day. For example, if a FoxNews 
article was shared 103 times, an Atlantic article was shared 95 times, and a CNN article was 
shared 30 times on June 12, they would be ranked in that order for first, second, and third most 
shared article in shooting related tweets on June 12. For the sake of simplicity and to avoid 
redundancy, when looking for context around the tweet-volume fluctuations I focused on the top 
shared articles in the shooting related tweets. 
 
Volume of Original Tweets and Retweets 
In this study, we look at two volumes of tweets: original tweets, and tweets including retweets. 
For each case study, I compare the total volume of original tweets as well as total volume of 
original tweets and retweets. To look at original tweets allows us to observe what users write 
when they create an original thought. However, when we include retweets, the volume of tweets 
increases up to tenfold. Because users often retweet far more often than they tweet (except for 
influencers or accounts with tens to hundreds of thousands of followers i.e. Hillary Clinton), I 
assume retweets are more representative of the actual distribution of conversation on Twitter. 
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Furthermore, looking at original tweets exclusively makes our data susceptible to bots. Bots are 
automated accounts built to spread ideas on social media rapidly. Bots do not retweet, but only 
send out original tweets and hundreds at a time. It is interesting to compare what tweets bots are 
tweeting versus what tweets real users are tweeting, and I hope to observe this in the next 
iteration of this project. 
 
Frames 
For this thesis, I operationalize framing of these events by the topic classifiers and the relative 
frequency different topics occur among tweets of the Left and Right. To identify the frames of 
the shooting, I measure the distribution of a political group’s tweets among my topics. Based on 
the percent of the conversation devoted to each topic, I determine whether it acts as a topic, a 
frame, or a major frame. To be classified as a frame, a topic such as Gun Control needs to make 
up at least 10% of the tweets of that political group, the Left or Right. To be classified as a major 
frame, a topic must make up 20% of the tweets of that political group. If a topic receives less 
than 10% of the conversation, it is merely a topic. If a topic receives less than 1% across 
demographics, I dropped it from the analysis. 
 
 
I also include topics that do not constitute frames, but rather give the frames context. For 
example, Racism is a topic, but not a frame in itself. Rather, it gives the Hate Crime frame 
context. Political Institutions and political actors such as Trump and Hillary are also topics that 
are not frames in themselves, but that give the tweets and frames context. For instance, if I 
identify Mental Health as a frame, for it makes up more than 10% of the tweets of those on the 
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Left, but Hillary also makes up 10% of Left tweets, Hillary is not a frame, but rather gives the 
Mental Health frame context, suggesting that there could be a correlation in tweets between 





I have made the topics so they fall under the frames I listed in the previous chapter. Most are self 
explanatory. For instance, if a tweet is classified as Gun Control, it clearly means that that tweet 
frames the shooting with the Gun Control frame. However, as I explained in the previous 
chapter, some are more broad. For example, I have created the Topics Terrorism as well as 
Domestic Terrorism, Radical Islamic Terrorism, and so forth. Terrorism will encompass all 
Domestic Terrorism and Radical Islamic Terrorism tweets, but the opposite would not be true. 
 
 
I have included the list here: Weapons, Gun Rights, Gun Control, Institutions, Self Defense, 
Terrorism, Radical Islamic Extremism, Domestic Terrorism, Foreign Relations, LGBTQ, 
Thoughts & Prayers, Hate Crime, White Supremacy, Antisemitism, Islamophobia, 
Homo/transphobia, Racism, Xenophobia, Sexism, Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, 
Sikhism, Mental Health, Slang Terms for Mental Health, Professional Mental Health terms, Civil 
Rights, Race & Ethnicity, Blacklivesmatter and Police Brutality, Trump, Hillary, Bernie, Obama, 
Republican, Democrat, Institutions, Political Correctness, Ignorance, Censorship, Visa, ICE, 
Wall, Undocumented Immigrants, DREAMer, Pathway to Citizenship, Sanctuary Cities, 
Amnesty, DAPA/DACA, Refugees, Deportation, Syrian Refugee Crisis, Background Check 
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This list is not comprehensive. For instance, I included topics such as Judaism and Antisemitism, 
Hinduism, Sikhism, more granular topics on immigration such as ICE and Mass Deportation. 
However, none of these topics registered at or above 1% of the conversation for any shooting, so 
I have excluded them from my analysis. Furthermore, my lists were not comprehensive and did 
not catch every type of conversation. For example, the Confederate flag debate was noticeably 
missing from my topics when I analyzed the Charleston data. However, I have captured some of 





Networks and Clusters 
The final step of my data analysis is observing how Twitter users cluster and polarize on social 
media networks. In this study, a cluster is a group of accounts that are not necessarily linked by a 
follower-followee relationship, but share some habit or trait, such as pattern or opinion.82 For 
 
instance, a cluster could be composed of a series of individuals that share the same article on 
social media, that follow the same account such as a political candidate’s account, or that tweet 
using similar language patterns. Twitter users tend to build their own clusters by filtering 
accounts into and out of their network. These decisions by the individual contribute to echo 









82 Tribalism in the twittersphere 
Hughes 41  
opinion, share an article, or retweet a friend and are often fed back that same opinion from their 
curated network.83 
 
Infamously, the United States’ politically opinionated social media users have taken part in a 
wave of intense clustering on social media that has lead to echo chambers. Scholars have argued 
that echo chambers such as these have contributed to the historical and unprecedented level of 
polarization and spread of misinformation taking place in the U.S. today.84 In Electome, the 
 
project which preceded and paved the way for this one, we focused primarily on the two largest 
and most recognizable groups in the 2016 presidential race: conservative leaning and liberal 




In this project, I hope to understand how information is shared across my three cases. I look at 
what clusters form by the urls shared by users. Each node, or dot, on the graphs I provide in the 
following chapters is a user that has shared a url in their tweet. It is colored based on my political 
ideology classifier. Then, each edge, or line connecting two nodes, is denoting two nodes that 
have shared the same url. For instance, if I shared a NY Times article, there would be an edge 
between my node and every other node that has shared the same article. An edge between two 
nodes becomes heavier the more urls the two nodes share in common. With this technique and 
with our demographic classification, we can see when Right and Left accounts 
 
83Vicario, Michela Del, Gianna Vivaldo, Alessandro Bessi, Fabiana Zollo, Antonio Scala, Guido Caldarelli, and 
Walter Quattrociocchi. "Echo Chambers: Emotional Contagion and Group Polarization on Facebook." Scientific 
Reports 6, no. 1 (2016). 
84Vicario (2016). 
Hughes 42  
share the same information and when they are isolated from one another. How often are users 
sharing the same article, and in turn, spreading the same information? Thus in this study I 
operationalize polarization by the extent of information-sharing across Right and Left users. In 
this study I show who makes up the clusters, when clusters are predominantly homogenous or 
heterogenous, how often clusters in a shooting are completely isolated from other clusters (i.e., 
how densely packed is the network graph), and the extent to which these characteristics of 
clusters vary across cases. 
 
Conclusion 
Every component of the data analysis that I’ve outlined above contributes to the story of a mass 
shooting. For each, I compare the similarities and differences in topics (framing) and in 
clustering (polarization). I then analyze these differing patterns and try to make sense of them. 
To begin, I look at the Charleston Church shooting in South Carolina on June 17, 2015. 




In the evening of Wednesday, June 17, 2015, the Emanuel AME (African Methodist Episcopal 
Church) was meeting for their weekly bible study. Among the thirteen people in attendance 
was the pastor, and South Carolina state senator Clementa C. Pinckney. They were joined by 
an unfamiliar face, that of Dylann Roof, a white man who asked specifically for Pinckney and 
sat next to him.85 
 
The study moved forward as planned, and Roof sat quietly as others interpreted the scripture. A 
little while in, however, Roof began arguing with the group, disagreeing with their 
interpretations aggressively. After almost an hour with the group, as they bowed their heads to 
pray, Roof pulled a Glock 41 from his fanny pack and aimed it at one of the participants, Sandy 
Jackson. Tywanza Sanders, Sandy’s nephew, pleaded with Roof, and asked him why he was 




Roof responded, "I have to do it. You rape our women and you're taking over our country. And 
you have to go."87 He said he was going to shoot everyone, and Sanders dove in front of Jackson 
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continued to shoot them while shouting racial epithets. He reloaded his gun 5 times. Sander’s 
mother and niece survived while pretending to be dead. 
 
Roof saw Sander’s mother, asked if she was shot, and when she said no explained, "Good, 'cause 
we need someone to survive, because I'm gonna shoot myself, and you'll be the only survivor." 
He pulled the trigger on his gun but realized he was out of ammunition. Then, he got in his car 
and fled.88 
 
After images of Roof and his car were spread through the media, a civilian identified the shooter 
and called the police. Roof was apprehended at a traffic stop. Within the car, Roof had a list of 
several churches, a confederate flag, a burned US flag, a gun, an empty ammunition box, and a 
scope attachment for the gun.89 The police immediately labelled the attack a hate crime.90 
 
Unlike the rest of the shooters we look at, Roof survived. He was taken to prison and put on trial. 
At the state level, he was charged and convicted of 9 counts of murder, 3 counts of attempted 
murder, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. He was sentenced 
to life imprisonment.91 At the federal level, he was convicted with 9 counts of a hate crime act 
 
resulting in death, 3 counts of a hate crime act involving an attempt to kill, 9 counts of 





90“Why it is So Hard to Gauge Level of Hate Crimes in US” Time, 
http://time.com/3926402/charleston-church-shooting-hate-crime-splc/ 
91 “Dylann Roof Jury: Death Penalty for Charleston Church Shooter” CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/10/us/dylann-roof-trial/index.html 
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religion involving an attempt to kill and use of a dangerous weapon, nad 9 counts of use of a 
firearm to commit murder during and in relation to a crime of violence.92 He showed only pride 
for his actions and was sentenced to death on January 10th, 2017. 
 
 
Trends in Data 
 
 
Charleston’s total volume of tweets spiked early on and steadily declined throughout the two 
weeks following. The only time the conversation spiked again was on June 26, for at the 








92“Dylann Roof Pleads Guilty to State Charges in Church Massacre,” CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/10/us/dylann-roof-guilty-plea-state-trial/index.html 
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Where the Vegas and Orlando had close to 50 people and many more injured, Charleston was 
much smaller with only 9 dead. However, Dylann Roof had a clear and explicit motive. This 
event was quickly defined as a hate crime by law enforcement and the media. Unlike Orlando 
and Las Vegas, there was little room for interpretation. Of the top articles shared on Twitter after 
the shooting, all reference the church as a historically black institution and acknowledge the 
violence as racially motivated. Although the context of Charleston arguably leaves less room for 
interpretation than the two other cases I will analyze, I nevertheless observe some significant 
patterns in how this event was framed by Twitter users. 
 
 
Of all the tweets analyzed, 40% were classified, suggesting that 40% of all tweets had some 
political edge. What do the others look like? Here’s one tweet that is not classified: 
 
In comparison here’s a tweet that was classified as relating to Race & Ethnicity, Racism, and 
Terrorism: 
 
In this example, 
 
@quanmon seems to 
have politicized the 
shooting with his tweet while @mikachu247 was shared her disgust at the event. And though 
expressing disgust could be seen as a political act in itself, I do not classify it as such, for almost 
all Twitter users expressed sadness and grief in the wake of mass shootings. 
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Of the 4 million original tweets collected after the Charleston shooting, I sampled 28,872 
original tweets. From those original tweets, there was a total of 89,328 retweets, or three times as 
many retweets as there were tweets. Of the 40% of Tweets that are classified and the 50% of 
Retweets that are classified, Table 1 shows the distribution of tweets and retweets between those 




The first, most obvious and interesting pattern is the disparity of volume of tweets between the 
Left and Right. While Tweets from the Left make up 52% of all original tweets around 
Charleston, the Right only makes up 8.7%. When we look at retweets, the disparity shifts to 
63.3% of all retweets and 19.13% for the Left and Right, respectively. For this shooting, the Left 
participated and tweeted originally 5 times as often as the right, and retweeted 3 times as often. 
The Right simply did not participate at the same rate as the Left. 
 
Next, Christianity dominates as a major frame. However, this massive topic reflects the term 
“church” being in the Christianity topic, and the shooting was widely named the Charleston 
Church Shooting. A frame did develop around a rumor that Charleston was framed as a hate 
crime against Christians and Christianity by Fox News.93 Yet, it is impossible to measure the 
 




93David Garcia, “And Boston was attack on Marathons. Fox Spins Charleston Shooting As Hate Crime 
Against Christians, Via @AddInfoOrg” June 18, 2015, 
https://twitter.com/DavidArtGar/status/611658097392680961. 
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Surprisingly, Gun Control made up 41% of Right retweets. However, because the Right was 
pulling from such a small pool of retweets (10,193 classified retweets), a single ideology 
classifier mistake distorted the results. Stephen King was incorrectly classified as Right, and his 
tweet, “Too many closed minds on gun control. Worse, far too many PROUDLY closed minds. 
Meanwhile, the American shooting gallery remains open.” was pulled into the sample and 
correctly classified as gun control. This one mistake, in such a small number of tweets, 
completely skewed the results. It had gotten 3,981 retweets, suggesting that it made up almost 
the entire 41% Right, Gun Control retweets. Similarly, Weapons registered as a frame coming 
from the Right, but very little explicit Gun Control, Gun Deaths, or Gun Rights language was 
used suggesting this stemmed mostly from the single mistake. 
 
 
After acknowledging the mistakes of the Christianity frame and the incorrect Gun Control frame, 
we can observe the more true frames of the Charleston shooting: Race & Ethnicity, Racism, and 
Terrorism all acted as frames when measured from Left original tweets, taking 14%, 11%, and 
11% of the conversation, respectively. This pattern continued into retweets, but Racism jumped 
dramatically from 11% to 30% of Left tweets. Although Hate Crime was not a registered topic, 
Racism drove the conversation coming from the Left, suggesting that though they did not use 
explicit hate crime language, they recognized and discussed openly the racial implications of the 
attack. None of these frames registered in Right tweets except for Race & Ethnicity in original 
tweets with 11%. This suggests that they neither talked about the racial implications of the attack 
explicitly nor did they acknowledge it as a Hate Crime. Rather, because it registered under Race 
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& Ethnicity, it talked about race without any hate language, suggesting they only talked about 
the shooting as executed by a white man in a black church. 
 
 
Although Domestic Terrorism never claimed enough of the conversation to be recognized as a 
frame, Terrorism more generally was a frame of the Left. Because this frame registered, it 
suggests the Left interpreted this as an act of Terrorism as well as a racially motivated hate 
crime. However, surprisingly, White Supremacy never registered as a frame and only gained 3% 
of original Left tweets at its most registered level. Race was talked about so explicitly by the left 
regarding the victims, but the perpetrator’s motivations were rarely framed as acts of White 
Supremacy, suggesting the Left only focused on the results of racism rather than the white 
supremacy that lead to that racism. In other words, the Left seemed to see that racism was an 
issue and lead to the deaths of 9 black church goers, yet Left users rarely if ever explicitly used 
language identifying white supremacy as the issue. Though racism is tied tightly to white 
supremacy, for an event to be framed as an act of white supremacy rather than an act of racism 
perhaps could yield different political and social outcomes. 
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Table 1: Distribution of total volume of Charleston the portion of total shows how the conversation was distributed between Blue, 
Red, and Unknown users. The first column of each demographic shows original Tweets, the second Retweets. None, the first topic, 
represent tweets that the machine did not label. Because None made up 60% of original tweets and 50% of retweets, the portion of 
topics represented here are the percent of tweets that were classified, excluding None Tweets. 













Portion of total 8.70% 19.13% 26.95% 17.21% 52.30% 63.66% 
none 58.07% 40.34% 64.99% 65.16% 59.38% 52.71% 
Blacklivesmatter 1.83% 0.72% 0.51% 1.10% 2.97% 1.36% 
christianity 40.72% 18.83% 15.46% 42.42% 33.42% 42.32% 
democrat 2.11% 1.49% 0.14% 0.24% 0.42% 0.14% 
domestic terrorism 0.52% 0.15% 0.17% 0.24% 1.26% 0.58% 
foreign relations 2.63% 0.85% 1.48% 7.80% 4.14% 1.18% 
gun control 4.58% 41.45% 1.05% 2.28% 4.71% 3.28% 
gun deaths 1.75% 0.67% 0.55% 2.60% 1.29% 2.37% 
gun rights 1.23% 0.61% 0.09% 0.60% 0.57% 0.39% 
hate crime 2.79% 1.16% 1.07% 3.36% 3.78% 2.72% 
hillary 1.71% 0.64% 0.49% 1.61% 1.37% 0.99% 
institutions 7.05% 7.81% 2.31% 5.06% 7.92% 5.68% 
islam 1.59% 4.28% 0.33% 0.50% 0.91% 0.12% 
mental health 3.86% 4.76% 1.54% 3.14% 4.48% 3.06% 
obama 10.35% 6.87% 2.60% 11.31% 8.31% 4.12% 
race & ethnicity 11.15% 4.14% 4.69% 14.04% 13.84% 13.65% 
racism 6.85% 4.17% 2.47% 6.44% 10.38% 30.94% 
radical islamic 1.04% 1.80% 0.36% 2.00% 0.85% 1.24% 
republican 2.23% 2.04% 0.44% 1.79% 3.34% 2.19% 
terrorism 5.65% 3.22% 2.46% 6.68% 10.82% 11.70% 
thoughts and prayers 16.16% 10.44% 4.01% 11.31% 9.24% 6.51% 
trump 1.15% 0.57% 0.12% 0.22% 0.41% 0.27% 
weapons 11.62% 44.06% 3.34% 10.25% 9.39% 12.13% 
white supremacy 1.47% 1.44% 0.60% 1.61% 2.58% 1.87% 
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One key current event to note 
that I did not measure was the 
conversation around the raised 
confederate flag on South Carolina grounds at the state house. Sorting through the data, tweets 
that referenced the confederate flag alone were not classified. However, a large portion of tweets 
referencing the confederate flag reference it in a political way that my classifiers catch. For 
example, tweets such as these 
two go unclassified by my 
classifiers, and the confederate 
flag conversation does not 
register, and therefore does not contribute to my measure of the portion of tweets about Racism, 
White Supremacy, or Institutions even if it should. Yet, for tweets like those by @tyceUF, they 
will be caught by the the Race & Ethnicity classifier and the Hate Crime classifier. However, I 




It is important and relevant to note, as well, that within this shooting, Democrats and Republican 
officeholders rarely registered as topics. Of course, Trump and Hillary were not quite relevant at 
this time in 2015. Yet, Obama rarely and inconsistently (across original tweets and retweets) 
registered as a frame. Political Institutions also were not quite relevant. This suggests that though 
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Charleston was politicized and both the Left and Right talked about it in political contexts, they 
did not explicitly link the failings of politicians or political institutions to the attack. 
 
Polarization 
After identifying these frames, we next wish to observe the polarization of Twitter users who 
sent tweets relevant to Charleston in the two weeks after the shooting. In Figure 1, I show the 
entire graph of users pulled from the sample 28,872 tweets, a total sample of 24,614 users, 
suggesting that the users tweeted at a rate of about 1.17 tweets per user. Of these users, 50.8% or 
12,504 users shared a url link. Predictably, the nodes are overwhelmingly blue, suggesting that 
the political Left shared far more articles than the Right. To share more articles suggests that the 
Left is more often citing news articles, blogs, op-eds, and so forth that relate to the shooting. 
Rather than just stating one’s opinion, to share a url attempts to share a source and cite either the 
Twitter user’s fact or from where they derived their opinion. Along with having more tweets 
classified by topic, for this reason I argue that sharing articles politicizes the shooting. And 
though we see in Figure 1 that red nodes are speckled among the blue, the largest clusters are 
dominated by blue nodes. 
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Figure 1: In this network graph, I show the entire graph of users pulled from the sample 28,872 tweets, a total 
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Figure 2: In Figure 2, we zoom in on the largest cluster. Here we can see that the vast majority of nodes are blue, yet 
there are a few red nodes sprinkled in. The most shared link was the petition to remove the confederate flag: 
http://petitions.moveon.org/sign/remove-the-confederate-3 
. 
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Figure 3: Figure 3 looks at the large number of nodes that share only a few edges with other nodes. These nodes are 
predominantly blue as well. These urls are generally links to smaller publications, blog stories, or articles that are 
about the shooting but did not go viral for example, an ABC news article of the story of the Good Samaritan who 
called 911 when they spotted Dylann Roof at the gas station. 
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Within the sample tweets, there were 10,112 urls shared, meaning that 80% of the urls shared 
were shared once. The average number of edges per node was 7.75. This means that for every 
user that shared an article, on average, 7.75 other users shared the same article. Because so many 
articles were shared and the average edges per node was so low, the majority of articles were not 
shared between many users. The virality of this shooting was low. Instead, it seems as though 
most of the discussion occurred in small clusters with new urls shared in each cluster, explaining 
the thin density of the network graph. In general, Twitter users did not share the same 
information when tweeting about Charleston nor did they share information with anyone outside 
of their ideological group. 
 
In Figure 2, we zoom in on the largest cluster. Here we can see that the vast majority of nodes 
are blue, yet there are a few red nodes sprinkled in. The most shared link was the petition to 
remove the confederate flag: http://petitions.moveon.org/sign/remove-the-confederate-3. The 
next most popular articles are 2) an Iron Den Forum post about the Charleston shooting,94 3) an 




Figure 3 looks at the large number of nodes that share only a few edges with other nodes. These 
nodes are predominantly blue as well. These urls are generally links to smaller publications, blog 
stories, or articles that are about the shooting but did not go viral. For example, an ABC news 
 
 
94 “Charleston Shootings” The Iron Den, 
https://www.theironden.com/forum/threads/23549-Charleston-shootings 
95“Charleston Shooting: Speaking the Unspeakable, Thinking the Unthinkable” Esquire, 
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a35793/charleston-shooting-discussion/ 
96“Shooting Suspect in Custody after Charleston Massacre” 
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This network graph shows clear 
polarization. Clusters form tightly around 
one another and rarely share edges with 
nodes outside of that cluster. This suggests 
that though many users shared articles 
during Charleston, they did not share them 
across party lines. In this bar chart, I show quantitatively how polarized these networks are. Each 
node is given a score from 0 to 1. If the node only shares edges with blue nodes, the node 
receives a score of 0. If it only shares edges with red nodes, it receives a score of 1. 
 
 
Though there are users who have scores closer to .5, the graph shows a clear slant. The vast 
majority are blue nodes, or Left users, that only share articles with other Left users. The Right 
barely shares articles at all. 
 
Conclusion 
Charleston was a hate crime that Twitter recognized and framed as having racial motives, but 
rarely used hate crime language explicitly. In this context, only 40% of all tweets were 
politicized, and the Left tweeted vastly more often than the Right. The Left framed the shooting 
as one motivated by racism, where Racism was 30% of the conversation. Neither Race & 
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Ethnicity nor Racism was a frame from the Right when observing retweets. Rather, Thoughts & 
Prayers was the only frame offered by the right. Terrorism was barely a frame, and only one 
from the Left. Domestic Terrorism never registered far above 1% of the conversation. 
 
 
Charleston was a deeply polarized event, with there being little if any shared urls between red 
and blue users. However, it is difficult for the Left to have shared similar articles with the Right, 
because the Right barely tweeted and barely shared any urls. On top of there being little shared 
information between Left and Right users, there was little shared information between the Left. 
Because there were so many articles, so few were shared multiple times (20%), and the average 
node had only 7.75 edges, clusters were isolated and rarely shared the same urls with those 
outside of their cluster, even if they were classified as having the same political ideology. In this 
case study, we see little shared information. 




On Saturday, June 12, 2016 in Orlando, Florida, Pulse nightclub was having “Latin Night”, a 
night to honor the intersection of the latinx and lgbtq communities of Orlando. As one of the 
most famous gay clubs in Orlando on one of their more popular nights, Pulse was packed with a 
racially diverse range of over 300 patrons ranging from teens to middle aged adults. 
 
In the early morning hours, Omar Mateen entered the nightclub. Official investigative updates 
from FBI Tampa report that at 2:02 a.m., Orlando police received reports that shots had been 
fired in the club. By 2:08, officers from various law enforcement agencies entered Pulse and 
engaged the shooter. By 2:18, the Orlando Police Department’s Special Weapons and Tactics 
(SWAT) team arrived and initiated a full “call-out” and began working to end the hostage 
situation. At 2:35, the shooter had his first contact with a 911 operator from inside Pulse: 
Orlando Police Dispatcher (D): Emergency 911, this is being recorded. 
Omar Mateen (M): In the name of God the Merciful, the beneficent [Arabic] 
D: What? 
M: Praise be to God, and prayers as well as peace be upon the prophet of God [Arabic]. 
I wanna let you know, I’m in Orlando and I did the shootings. 
D: What’s your name? 
M: My name is I pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State. 
D: Ok, What’s your name? 
M: I pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi may God protect him [Arabic], on 
behalf of the Islamic State. 
D: Alright, where are you at? 
M: In Orlando. 
D: Where in Orlando? 
[End of call.] 
Hughes 60  
In the next hour, Mateen engaged in three more conversations with the OPD’s Crisis Negotiation 
Team ranging from 3 to 16 minutes. Within these conversations, the attacker identified himself 
as an Islamic soldier, pledged his allegiance to ISIL, and told the negotiator to tell America to 
stop bombing Syria and Iraq. Those US bombings and attacks on Iraq and Syria, he explained, is 
why he “is out here right now.” 
 
 
Mateen continued to talk to the Crisis Negotiation Team and threatened to “ignite” a van full of 
bombs and vest bombs outside of the club as well as vests like those “used in France,” which we 
assumed to be a reference to the terror attacks in France that had occurred in the not-so-distant 
past. He praised the brothers responsible for the Boston Marathon Bombing, and continued to 
threaten, “In the next few days, you’re going to see more of this type of action going on.” 
 
Between 4:21 and 5:00 am, victims were slowly evacuated by the OPD. At 5:02, the team began 
to breach a wall with explosive and armored vehicles to enter the premises. By 5:15, Mateen 
was shot multiple times in a direct confrontation with the police, and was killed.97 
 
At the time, this shooting was the largest, most deadly mass shooting in United States history, 
surpassing the shooting at Virginia Tech in 2007. In the attack, Matten murdered 49 of the club’s 
patrons (39 died at the scene, 11 were pronounced dead in the hospital) and injured 58 more. The 






97“Investigative Update Regarding Pulse Nightclub Shooting,” FBI.gov, 
https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/tampa/news/press-releases/investigative-update-regarding-pul 
se-nightclub-shooting 
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Trends in the Data 
 
Orlando had a spike in tweets at the beginning of the two weeks, but fell as a slower rate with 
larger, more irregular spikes than Charleston. I sampled a total of 25,778 original tweets and 
158,025 retweets, 6 times the number of original tweets.  
 
 
Unlike the other shootings I analyze in this thesis, Orlando occurred during the presidential 
campaigns of the 2016 election. The Twittersphere was already alive with political debate when 
Orlando happened, making the conversation abnormally federal-politics heavy. For example, 
Democrats and Republicans are two of the most common topics with Orlando, but they barely 
registered at Vegas and Charleston. This can get confusing, for some of my topics are 
Hughes 62  
Republicans and Democrats—meaning Republican and Democratic candidates and 
officeholders—but I also analyze Left and Right users. When in this analysis I use Republican or 
Democrat, I am referring to the topic of either Republicans or Democrats, meaning officeholders 
and candidates from either party, such as Trump or Clinton. When referring to the demographic 
of those tweeting, I use Left-Right, blue-red language. 
 
 
When Mateen struck, it was becoming more certain that Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump were 
going to be the respective Democratic and Republican candidates for the 2016 presidential 
election. Politics was a huge leader in the conversation surrounding the shooting on Twitter. This 
election was particularly controversial and engaged with social media platforms like Twitter at 
an unprecedented rate, for Donald Trump used Twitter as his primary platform for public 
communication. Trump was referenced in 52.7% of original tweets, completely dominating the 
conversation. Among retweets, Trump was huge in the conversation among all three 
demographics, Left, Right, and Unknown, equally at 47% of retweets. Left and Right also 




Unlike Charleston and Vegas, the vast majority of Orlando tweets were classified 94%. This 
suggests that almost all of the tweets had some political edge. Below is one of the very few 
tweets that was not classified as relating to any topic: 
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Though a tweet about Gov. Bobby Jindal has some obvious political motives, I didn’t capture 
them, for I did not include Bobby Jindal as a term. On the other hand, here is a tweet classified as 
Hillary, Politically Correct, and Terrorism: 
 
This suggests that the vast majority of the tweets around Orlando are politically oriented, and 
even many of those that were not classified could have some political edge. 
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The first interesting trend in the Orlando data, as I suggested before, is the prevalence of political 
party and political candidate topic tweets. Donald Trump’s topic held 47% of the Right, Left, and 
Unknown groups. Hillary, on the other hand, fell far behind. The Left rarely referenced her; 
Hillary was only a topic in 8.6% of Left retweets. Yet, the Hillary topic still acted as a major 
topic among Unknown and Right users. The Left talked about the Right’s candidate much more 
than they talked about their own. The Right, however, talked about their own candidate often, yet 
also managed to talk about the Left’s candidate frequently. 
 
 
On a similar note, the Right’s tweets and retweets were classified as having a Democrat topic 
(30.13%) far more than they were classified as having a Republican topic (11.58%). The Left’s 
tweets, as well, were classified as having a Republican topic (45.10%) far more than they were 
classified as having a Democrat topic (5.70%). In regard to talking about politics, it seems as if 
each side, Left and Right, used the Orlando shooting as ammunition to attack or critique the 
other side. Unknown users stayed neutral, retweeting about Republicans (12.23%) and 
Democrats (12.41%) at the same rate. 
 
 
Across the board, LGBTQ Issues accounted for about 10-20% of the conversation. However, 
Hate Crime never registered at even 1% for any of the demographics. After the shooting, rumors 
spread about Mateen’s motivations in choosing an LGBTQ club as a target. And though he was 
rumored to be homophobic or gay himself, no reports of his sexuality have been verified nor 
have evidence been shown that he had intentions of committing a hate crime. Yet, debate spread 
across the Twittersphere about the importance of calling this attack a hate crime along with a 
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terrorist attack. Obama himself identified the attack as “an act of terror and an act of hate.”98 
However, Twitter never latched onto Orlando as a hate crime, and only talked about LGBTQ 
issues as facts about the event, who the victims were, where it happened, not the motivation. 
 
 
Gun Control language, on the other hand, acted as a frame for the Left, making up 18.10% of 
tweets and 21.09% of retweets. For Unknown users, Gun Control acted as a frame as well, 
making up 13.63% of original tweets and 11.33% of retweets. The Right, however, did not 
reference Gun Control at the same rate. Any Gun Control only acted as a frame for original 
tweets, but fell off for retweets. Gun Deaths and Gun Rights also did not register. Weapons, 
however, registered as a topic quite consistently across demographics between 16-18%, with a 
significant rise for Left retweets at 23.67%. This suggests that Twitter users were talking about 
guns, talking about bullets, semi-automatic weapons, and so forth, but not using explicit 
language such as “ban”, “control”, “restriction”, “rights”, etc. 
 
 
Terrorism registered as a frame across all political ideologies, and a major frame for the Right in 
original tweets (29.49%) and retweets (34.24%) as well as for Unknown users at 22.58% of 
retweets. All demographics of Twitter user classified and framed the event as an act of terrorism, 









98 “Read President Obama's Speech on the Orlando Nightclub Shootings” Time.com, 
http://time.com/4365454/orlando-shooting-president-obama-speech-transcript/ 
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Table 1: Distribution of total volume of Orlando tweets. The Portion of Tweets shows how the conversation was 
distributed between Blue, Red, and Unknown users. The first column of each demographic shows original Tweets, 
the second Retweets. None, the first topic, represent tweets that the machine did not label. The portion of topics 
represented below the None row are the percent of tweets that were classified excluding None Tweets. 













Portion of Tweets 43.11% 42.44% 13.81% 12.78% 43.08% 44.78% 
none 8.69% 9.15% 5.39% 6.06% 5.18% 3.49% 
Bernie 1.31% 0.68% 3.30% 12.98% 3.14% 2.27% 
Buying 0.67% 0.24% 1.01% 1.32% 1.84% 2.63% 
Censorship 0.83% 1.73% 0.42% 0.08% 0.04% 0.01% 
Christianity 1.48% 1.07% 0.65% 1.28% 1.09% 0.29% 
Democrat 19.33% 30.13% 7.48% 12.41% 5.93% 5.70% 
Foreign Relations 3.92% 3.75% 2.67% 4.03% 1.96% 1.79% 
Gun Control 10.64% 7.39% 13.63% 11.33% 18.10% 21.09% 
Gun Deaths 1.48% 1.08% 1.81% 0.48% 2.20% 9.97% 
Gun Rights 6.16% 7.33% 4.36% 3.96% 3.40% 10.29% 
Hillary 24.42% 23.93% 19.18% 21.70% 12.75% 8.60% 
Homo/transphobia 0.75% 0.63% 0.59% 0.53% 1.77% 1.03% 
Institutions 7.02% 7.01% 8.73% 11.64% 10.60% 21.63% 
Islam 21.89% 22.03% 14.04% 17.45% 9.62% 4.30% 
LGBTQ 19.74% 16.96% 13.18% 10.61% 16.60% 11.50% 
Obama 12.90% 9.50% 10.04% 12.15% 7.15% 5.14% 















Republican 10.46% 11.58% 12.68% 12.23% 25.17% 45.10% 















Trump 52.11% 46.59% 60.87% 47.07% 48.45% 46.96% 
Weapons 16.69% 16.81% 16.89% 13.59% 18.64% 23.67% 
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registered as a frame for the Right, almost a major frame, and Islam measured as a major frame. 
For the Left, however, neither Radical Islamic Extremism nor Islam registered as frames. 
Domestic Terrorism never registered at 1% or higher for any user group. Finally, Thoughts & 
Prayers registered the least often of all of the shootings with Orlando. 
 
Polarization 
As with the other shootings, I look next at Polarization. In Figure 1, we show the entire network 
of users who shared Orlando related tweets. Of all the 25,778 tweets, there was a total sample of 
16,348 users, suggesting they tweeted at a rate of 1.67 per user, the highest tweet rate for all of 
the shootings. Of these users, 58%, or 9,488, shared a url linking to an article related to 
Orlando. Of all the shootings this was the largest portion of users to share a link along with their 
tweet. 
 
The top shared Right url was a link to a Clash Daily post titled, “Dear CNN: Orlando Terrorist 
Muslim Registered Democrat Targeted 
Gays,” along with two other articles 
from Fox News and PJMedia titled, 
“Orlando Massacre Prompts Some 
LGBT Community to Come Out for 
Trump,” and “I’m a Gay Activist, and After Orlando, I Have Switched My Vote to Trump.”99 
 
 
99“Dear CNN: Orlando Terrorist Muslim Registered Democrat Targeted Gays,” ClashDaily.com, 
clashdaily.com/2016/06/dear-cnn-orlando-terrorist-muslim-registered-democrat-targeted-gays/ 
“Orlando Massacre Prompts osme in LGBT Community to Come Out for Trump,” FoxNews, 
www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/06/18/orlando-massacre-prompts-some-in-lgbt-community-to-come- 
out-for-trump.html 
“I’m a Gay Activist, and After Orlando, I’m Switching My Vote to Trump,” PJMedia.com, 
pjmedia.com/trending/2016/06/12/gay-activist-after-orlando-trump-voter/ 
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The top Left url was a Huffington Post article and a TIME article citing Trump’s “humble brag” 
after the shooting, along with Vanity Fair and the Hill articles citing how the GOP blocked a vote 
on LGBT rights days after the shooting. 
 
 
This network graph looks radically different from the one for Charleston. Right away, one can 
recognize that finding clear clusters is more difficult than it was in Charleston. The polarization 
is significantly lower in Orlando than in Charleston, showing that blue and red nodes, or the Left 
and Right, share the same articles. Furthermore, Left and Right, red and blue, both shared urls at 
the same rate, unlike Charleston, where the Left was the only group participating in the Twitter 




In Figures 2 and 3, we zoom in on blue and red clusters. We can see that though the graph is 
polarized and there are clear blue and red tinted clusters, each cluster has the opposite color 












“Donald Trump Tweets Disgusting Humble Brag After Orlando Massacre” HuffingtonPost, 
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-orlando_us_575d92e6e4b0e39a28addbe6 
“Donald Trump Faces Backlash for Tweets After Shooting” Time, 
time.com/4365411/orlando-shooting-donald-trump-tweet-congrats/ 
“Days After Orlando Attack, House GOP Blocks Bill On Gay Rights Amendment” Vanity Fair, 
www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/06/house-gop-blocks-vote-lgbt-rights-amendment 
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Figure 1: For Orlando, we pulled a sample of 25,778 tweets, a total sample of 16348 users, suggesting that the users 
tweeted at a rate of about 1.67 to 1, the highest tweet rate of all the shootings. Of these users, 58% shared a url link. 
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Figure 2: In Figure 2, we zoom in on a blue cluster. Here we can see that the vast majority of nodes are blue, yet 
there are a few red nodes sprinkled in. The most shared link was the petition to remove the confederate 
flag:http://petitions.moveon.org/sign/remove-the-confederate-3 
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Figure 3: Figure 3 looks at a red cluster. Though the cluster is tightly red and polarized, blue is highlighted throughout 
as well. Edges context from within the cluster outside to many other clusters, blue and red, as well. We can also see 
the small cluster of grey, unknown users in the top right corner. 
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Orlando is also more densely packed than Charleston. In this sample of Orlando related tweets, 
there were 4,135 URLs shared, meaning that only 50% of urls shared were shared once. The 
average number of nodes per cluster was 34.04, meaning when a user shared a url, on average 
there were 34 other users that shared that same url. Where Charleston had clouds of nodes 
floating outside the largest cluster with only a few edges, those isolated, tiny clusters are almost 
nonexistent in the Orlando graph. Rather, even nodes that only have one edge usually share that 
edge with a node more deeply ingrained in the cluster. This suggests that urls in Orlando were 
more condensed and shared than the other shootings. 
 
 
We can see in this bar chart the quantitative 
analysis of this polarization. As I’ve explained, 
if a node is rated 0.0, it means it only shares 
edges with blue nodes. If a node is given a 
rating of 1.0, it only shares edges with red 
nodes. For Charleston we saw majorly 
polarized networks, with almost all of the 
nodes being either classified as 0.0 or 1.0. With Orlando, though 0.0 and 1.0 nodes make up a 
large portion of the bar chart, there are also many nodes at other points. Similarly though the 
network graph has clear clusters dominated by blue and red nodes, there is far more mixing of 
red and blue in the Orlando graphs as compared to those for Charleston. 
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Conclusion 
Twitter users, overall, politicized Orlando heavily, placing it squarely in the middle of the 
presidential elections. Using that federal, political party and political candidate language, Twitter 
users seemed to use Orlando to focus on the opposite party and opposite candidate--except for 
the Right who talked about Trump just as often as the Left. 
 
 
From my observations and measurements, Orlando was framed by the Left as Terrorism. But 
Left users rarely used language that recalled the War on Terror, Islamic Terrorism, or even 
Domestic Terrorism. Rather, they referenced Terrorism broadly, and focused more heavily on 
the Gun Control frame. The Right, on the other hand, framed this event as an act of Terrorism, 
and one of Radical Islamic Extremism. They referenced Islam at a rate of 20% of Tweets, 
suggesting that language referencing Islam gives their Orlando frames further context. Orlando 
was also talked about in the context of LGBTQ Issues by both sides, but neither hate crime nor 
homo/transphobic language was used. 
 
 
The Left and Right participated in the conversation equally, shared urls at the same rate, and 
shared the same articles far more often than after Charleston. Though there were clear 
clusters that had blue and red tints, suggesting there was polarization, the majority of users 
shared articles with users of other political ideologies. 
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Furthermore, there was a small number of articles that were shared widely in Orlando, while 
Charleston had many articles that were not shared widely. And, users who shared articles about 
Orlando shared articles with an average of 34 other users, making Orlando much more densely 
packed than Charleston. This suggest that Orlando users clusters were much less defined than 
Charleston users, and those less-defined clusters shared similar urls with each other, within and 
across political ideological lines. 
 
 
However, though users seemed less polarized in Orlando by my measure of url shares, the Left 
and Right took opposing stances and framed Orlando differently. This measure of polarization 
does not measure interaction, but rather shared information and url shares. Perhaps users did 
share more of the same urls in Orlando than after Charleston, but perhaps it was purely the same 
information, facts that users agreed on, but facts they framed differently. This shows a flaw in 
my measure, for the frames show a Left and Right at war and opposing each other, where my 
network graph shows interaction and shared urls. This suggests that shared urls do not suggest 
any ideological bridge was built. 




On September 28th, 2017, Stephen Paddock checked into the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino 
in Las Vegas, Nevada. He had specifically requested one large suite, a living room, kitchen, and 
separate bedroom had floor to ceiling windows with “uninterrupted views of the Las Vegas 
Strip.”100 Over the course of three days, Paddock left and returned to the resort incrementally 
 
with an excess of 10 suitcases. He stayed up all night gambling for two nights and was generous 
with tips, but reported to have a “god complex,”101 expecting the staff to serve quickly. 
 
 
At 10:06pm, on the 32nd floor of the resort, Paddock smashed the window of his room with a 
hammer. When Mandalay Bay security guard Jesus Campos, responding to the break, knocked 
on his door, Paddock shot through the door and killed him. Looking down on the Route 91 
Harvest festival into a crowd of 22,000 people, Paddock began to fire. 
 
 
The first stretch of fire did not disrupt the Harvest Festival concert. Many in the crowd and the 
performer thought there were merely firecrackers and fireworks being released during one of the 
final songs. The audience began to stir as members of the crowd noticed some around them fall, 
but the show continued. Thirty-six seconds after the first round of automatic fire, Paddock began 
unloading a second round. The crowd began to panic and take cover. 
 
100“What Happened Inside the Shooter’s Suite in the Mandalay Hotel” CNN 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/03/us/mandalay-bay-hotel-room-what-we-know/index.html 
101“Stephen Paddock, Las Vegas shooter, called hotel security before rampage”, CBS News, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/stephen-paddock-las-vegas-shooter-hotel-security-rampage/ 
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After a third and fourth round, with a cumulative of more than 900 shots fired, muffled gunfire 
heard in a video at the scene suggested more rounds were fired within the hotel room. Officers 
arrived seven minutes after the shooting started, and Paddock took his own life. Less than a year 
and a half after Orlando, Vegas became the worst mass shooting on American soil with 59 dead 
and 851 wounded. 
 




Unlike Orlando, Vegas occurred on the night of the 1st around 10pm, explaining the data’s start 
at zero and quick spike. Out of all of our shootings, Vegas has the largest volume of Tweets over 
the two week period, with over 4 million original tweets about the event. On top of having the 
largest total volume of original tweets, Vegas had the biggest spike in tweets and the quickest 
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decline. I sampled a total of 27,000 original tweets relating to Las Vegas and 100,000 retweets. 
Vegas had the fewest tweets that fell into one of my classification buckets, with 65% of tweets 










96% of Orlando’s tweets are classified and 50% of Charleston, but only 35% of Vegas tweets are 
classified. The relatively low percentage of classified tweets suggests that Twitter users were 
tweeting significantly less about political issues than they were in the other two shootings. They 
were not referencing Terrorism, Race & Ethnicity, Gun Control, Gun Rights, or any other topic 
at a comparable rate to Charleston or Orlando. Furthermore, Vegas users were the least likely to 
share URLs. Out of all of their tweets, only 13% contained URLs compared to Charleston’s 50% 
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Table 1: Distribution of total volume of Vegas tweets. The Portion of Tweets shows how the conversation was distributed 
between Left, Right, and Unknown users. The first column of each demographic shows original Tweets, the second Retweets. 
None, the first topic, represent tweets that the machine did not label. The portion of topics represented below the None row are 
the percent of tweets that were classified excluding None Tweets. Vegas was the least politicized of all the events, with None 
classifying 65% of all tweets, and up to 70% of Unknown Retweets. This suggests that only 35% of original tweets were 
politically oriented. 













Portion of Tweets 38.70% 39.80% 24.97% 22.59% 36.33% 37.62% 
none 69.63% 65.66% 74.72% 71.20% 70.26% 60.63% 
Buying 2.04% 1.59% 2.15% 0.87% 2.44% 3.21% 
Christianity 1.23% 3.54% 1.59% 0.57% 1.21% 0.35% 
Democrat 8.50% 6.23% 3.32% 12.57% 2.45% 1.51% 
Foreign Relations 4.40% 10.39% 3.71% 2.78% 3.32% 4.52% 
Gun Control 9.22% 7.56% 13.20% 19.28% 14.43% 20.07% 
Gun Deaths 3.71% 2.89% 6.56% 1.56% 5.72% 4.47% 
Gun Rights 2.45% 1.13% 1.59% 0.46% 2.22% 1.77% 
Hillary 4.70% 4.58% 2.05% 0.76% 1.51% 0.76% 
Institutions 9.21% 6.34% 12.32% 19.78% 12.26% 27.43% 
Islam 0.55% 5.71% 0.34% 5.70% 0.29% 2.04% 
Mental Health 0.94% 0.33% 1.05% 0.19% 1.30% 0.86% 
Obama 1.99% 4.33% 0.71% 0.69% 1.13% 0.48% 
Professional 0.39% 0.13% 0.49% 4.44% 0.30% 0.07% 
Race & Ethnicity 4.06% 1.48% 4.29% 2.66% 5.56% 2.96% 















Republican 4.11% 8.47% 3.59% 1.03% 6.40% 6.53% 
Slang Terms 3.12% 1.06% 1.76% 0.78% 2.02% 0.91% 















Trump 22.21% 15.54% 20.62% 7.08% 21.16% 15.17% 
Weapons 28.35% 25.15% 41.36% 54.53% 39.55% 36.57% 
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Left and Right Twitter tweeted at the same rate, each making up about 40% of the total Vegas 
conversation.. For original tweets, 30% of the Left and the Right’s tweets were classified, and for 
retweets 35% and 40% of the Right and Left’s tweets were classified, respectively, suggesting 
the two sides were equally likely to frame the event in political terms. 
 
 
As with Orlando, Trump was a major topic for both the Left and Right at the same rates for 
original tweets. But he was a minor topic when we observe retweets. The Trump topic was not 
nearly as major in Vegas as it was in Orlando at its highest point making up 20% of original 
tweets for the Left and Right. Hillary, predictably, fell off of the charts. Institutions made up a 
large portion of the conversation and was a major topic for the Left at 27.43%. This suggests that 
the Left referenced some political institution or office 30% of the time while talking about the 
Vegas shooting, most likely expressing grief or criticism of legislation for not changing gun 
policy. The Left framed Vegas as an issue of Gun Control, just making the cut as a major frame 
at 20.07% of the conversation. Weapons was also a major frame and was referenced in 36.57% 
of tweets, suggesting that though they only talked about Gun Control explicitly 20% of the time, 
they referenced the weapon used almost twice as often. 
 
 
The Right also framed the shooting in terms of Weapons, but it only made up about 25% of the 
discourse. They did not talk about the weapons in terms of control, rights, deaths, or even how 
Paddock bought the guns. I included the term “bump stock” in weapons, which was a large topic 
of discourse on the Right and Left. Thoughts & Prayers registered as a frame. Surprisingly, 
Radical Islamic Extremism and Foreign Relations registered as frames as well. Shortly after 
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Vegas, ISIS claimed Stephen Paddock and the shooting as their own. The Right did frame the 
shooting as an attack by ISIS, mostly in the beginning of the discourse after the event. Though 
those rumors were eventually squashed, the Right framed the event in this light. 
 
 
In Vegas, Terrorism became a frame for the Left as well. However, it was a highly contested 
frame, and not one associated with Islam or ISIS. The Terrorism classifies as a frame at 13.5% of 
the Left’s tweets, but Radical Islamic Extremism, Islam, and Foreign Relations never registered 
above 5%, suggesting they rarely correlate the two in Vegas. Where the Right pushed the frame 
that Vegas was an act motivated by ISIS, the Left questioned why it was not seen as a terror 
attack in of itself. A common headline from the Left questioned why Vegas was not framed as a 
terror attack, for it instigated terror in the general public and was an event of mass violence. 
Many cited the federal definitions of terror that require an act of violence to have an explicit 
political motive. Without a clear motive in Vegas, it was not federally defined as a terror attack. 
However, Nevada state law classified it as a terror attack. The law defines an act of terrorism as 
"Any act that involves the use of violence intended to cause great bodily harm or death to the 
general population." It seems as though the Left worked to frame the Vegas shooting as a terror 
attack to suggest the US should not treat events like Orlando and Vegas so differently. 
 
 
Furthermore, many argued, because Stephen Paddock was white and not Muslim, he was not 
classified as a terrorist but rather as being a “lone wolf” or having “lost his mind.” The Left in 
particular argued that this is a privilege of race and religion, that when committing an act of 
terror, a white man will be labelled crazy and a “lone wolf,” but a Muslim man would be labeled 
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a terrorist. They argue that Americans feel an intrinsic fear and threat of Muslim people that they 
do not feel with white people, making them label such act like Orlando as ones of International 
Terrorism or Radical Islamic Extremism though it may more accurately be described as a 
Domestic Terror attack. 
 
 
However, noticeably absent from the topics analysis is Domestic Terrorism and Mental Health. 
Not once did Domestic Terrorism register at 1%, and no language regarding Mental Health, be it 
slang, or more professional terms, registered as a frame. The term “lone wolf” is within the slang 
topic that never registered above 3%. Racism never reached above 7%, and white supremacy did 
not register once about 1%. 
 
Polarization 
In this network graph, we look at the entire network of Las Vegas related tweets. For Vegas, I 
pulled a sample of 27,000 tweets, and of those tweets, there were 22,605 accounts, suggesting an 
average tweet rate of 1.19. Of those users, only 13.7% shared urls, the lowest rate of each case 
study, further bolstering my observation that Vegas was the least politicized of all the shootings 
 
 
Zooming in, we look at the largest cluster of users in Figure 2. Interestingly, though there are 
blue and red nodes within the cluster, the vast majority have an Unknown political 
classification, meaning they result in a grey node. Though Vegas is highly polarized, it seems as 
though the majority of shared information is shared by those with an Unknown political 
ideology. As a reminder, the Unknown ideology group are those who the machine was not 60% 
or more 
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confident in its classification, suggesting that they are either moderate or rarely post political 
content. 
 
Next, in Figure 3, we can see there is a large cloud of nodes that share only a few edges with 
other nodes, or none at all. There are slightly more blue nodes than red, for Left leaning users 
shared articles at a higher rate than Right leaning. Because there are so few edges between nodes, 
this suggest that there was little url sharing among Twitter users after Vegas. Small clusters with 
only a few edges between a few nodes suggest that each user in that cluster has shared a url with 
few other shares, perhaps a small article, a blog post, or link to an obscure website. 
 
The top url shared in Vegas was a Gofundme for the victims of Vegas.102 The next top shared 
 
articles are all from left leaning publications: a New York Times piece, a Guardian piece, a 
Washington Post article, CNN, and NBC all reporting on the shooting.103 After these pieces, the 
next top shared urls are an Independent piece framing the shooting as organized by ISIS, and a 
Fox News article on a CBS lawyer who said the Vegas victims deserved it, for the majority of 









102 “Las Vegas Victims’ Fund” GoFundMe, https://www.gofundme.com/dr2ks2-las-vegas-victims-fund 
103 “Multiple Weapons Found in Las Vegas Gunman’s Hotel Room” New York Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/us/las-vegas-shooting.html 
“Las Vegas Live Updates” CNN, www.cnn.com/2017/10/02/us/las-vegas-shooting-live/index.html 
“Names of Las Vegas victims emerge as police reveal gun stockpile – as it happened” The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2017/oct/02/las-vegas-two-dead-in-mandalay-bay-ca 
sino-shooting-latest-updates 
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Figure 1: In this network graph, we look at the entire network of Las Vegas related tweets. For Vegas, we pulled a sample of 
27,001 tweets, and of those tweets, there were 22,605 accounts, suggesting an average tweet rate of 1.19. Of those users, 3,099 
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Figure 2: Zooming in, in this chart we look at the main cluster of users. Interestingly, though there are blue and red nodes within 
the cluster, the vast majority have an unknown political classification, meaning they result in a grey node. 
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Figure 3: Figure 3 looks at the large number of nodes that share only a few edges with other nodes, or none at all. 
These nodes are predominantly blue as well. These urls are generally links to smaller publications, blog stories, or 
articles that are about the shooting but did not go viral. 
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In the Vegas sample there was a total number of 8,118 different urls shared. With an of 10 nodes 
per user, there were many different urls shared, and few viral urls. Each user stayed within a 
small cluster and shared the same url as only a few users, meaning many different narratives 
could accompany the Vegas shooting rather than a few dominating ones. 
 
 
As a reminder, this bar chart represents the polarity of those who shared articles on Twitter. A 
rating of 0.0 means the node shared edges with only blue nodes and a rating of 1.0 means the 
node only shared edges with red nodes. 
Again, Vegas is highly polarized, much 
more so than Orlando, and the Left shared 
more urls than the Right, though not as 
extreme as in Charleston 
 
Conclusion 
The Left and Right tweeted about Vegas at 
the same rate, but used different frames. The Left framed the event as an issue of Gun Control 
and Terrorism, while the Right framed it as a act of Terrorism while citing the Weapon used. 
However the types of terrorism the Left and Right framed the shooting as were radically 
different. The Right framed the event as an act of Radical Islamic Terrorism after ISIS tried to 
claim the act as their own. The Left, on the other hand, used this event as an opportunity to argue 
that it was an act of terrorism though the perpetrator was not Muslim. From this event, it seemed 
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as though the Left hoped to critique the public’s tendencies to privilege white people by 
suggesting white mass murderers are “lone wolfs” and not to be feared as deeply as Muslim 
murderers, in turn contributing to islamophobic tendencies and racial biases. 
 
 
The Left and Right were highly polarized and rarely shared information. Furthermore, through 
the network graphs we can see that the Vegas url sharing was highly isolated. There were many 
tiny clusters that shared no edges outside of their own cluster, suggesting that yes, these groups 
were polarized, but also only sharing the same information as a few other users. 






Participation in Twitter Discourse and Political Agenda 
One clear difference between each shooting was who was tweeting. After Charleston, the Right 
tweeted at a much slower rate than the Left. When they did tweet, they primarily used language 
such as Thoughts & Prayers. Out of the tweets they sent, a small portion were politicized or had 
any political angle or reference. It seemed that no one dared send tweets at all, let alone political 
ones. However, the Left quickly politicized the event and drove the discourse. The Right shared 
urls at a low rate, while the Left cited their sources and shared information through urls after the 
attack. Vegas showed a similar pattern, though not at the same rate. 
 
 
From this pattern, there seems to be a correlation between participation and the tweeter’s 
political agenda. In other words, the political Left and Right on Twitter tend to tweet about an 
event when a frame that has been constructed around the event contributes to their political 
agenda. If no such frame exists, the Twitter users can simply not tweet about the event, or not 
acknowledge that there are any political implications of the event. For example, in Charleston, 1) 
the shooter was a white supremacist, 2) he used a handgun he legally purchased to 3) commit a 
hate crime against black people 4) in a church. There seemed to be no way the Right could build 
a frame that contributed to their agenda. If anything, to acknowledge this as a political event 
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would only give fuel to the fire of the Left to build frames that tore down the Right agenda. The 
Right chose to not participate in the discourse, but instead offered condolences for a sad incident. 
 
 
On the other hand, when we observe Orlando, it is clear that multiple frames can be born from 
the event. Both the Right and Left participated equally, and both pushed different frames that 
were in line with their political agenda. The Right argued that Terrorism, and specifically 
Radical Islamic Extremism was the main issue at hand. They argued this frame while also talking 
about Donald Trump and the Democrats. The Left, on the other hand, argued that Terrorism was 
the main problem exposed by Orlando, and Guns along with it. They tweeted their frame in the 
context of Donald Trump and Republicans. It seems as though both the Left and Right used 
Orlando to either argue for or against Donald Trump, and against the opposing political party. 
Orlando presented the opportunity for both parties to create a frame around the event that 
bolsters their own political agenda 
 
 
Finally, Vegas was not highly politicized by either side. The Right, in this instance, had few 
frames to make, except to try to frame this as an event funded by ISIS. The Left tweeted slightly 
more than the Right and focused on Terrorism and Guns, but did not tweet, or at least, tweet 
politically at the same rate as Orlando. Something about Vegas made them apathetic, and 
something about Orlando, passionate. 
 
 
This shows that Orlando was a special case out of the three studies. Orlando incited more 
emotion and passion from both the Left and Right, which I imagine is tied tightly with the threat 
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felt by Orlando compared to the threat felt by greater America after Charleston and Vegas. I 
believe this threat is directly correlated with the frame of the event and America's fear of Muslim 
violence and complacency with white violence. 
 
Shared Information 
In this study, I measured shared information by url shares in network graphs. The fewer urls that 
are shared, and the more widely the few urls reach, the more consolidated and consistent the 
narrative is around the shooting. In other words, the less urls that are circling the Twittersphere, 
the more likely that a user coming across a url will take in the same information as another user. 
This shared information creates a shared reality. A shared reality and shared truth is essential to 
depolarization. If facts cannot be agreed upon, consensus cannot be reached or productive 
dialogue. Alternatively, if two groups absorb different or opposite information and believe 
opposing facts to be true, it will further push the groups to the extremes. These differing realities 
make individuals within the group more skeptical and less trusting of those outside of the group. 
They will only take in and deem valid information from those who they see as relevant and 
important within their own group. Without any external fact checks, the narratives can continue 
to spiral further from the opposing group’s narrative, pushing the groups to opposite extremes, 
contributing to further group polarization. 
 
 
In Vegas and Charleston, there was very little shared information. The groups were highly 
polarized by political ideology. Yet, even within a political ideology, there was little information 
shared. For both shootings, there were many tiny clusters as opposed to large clusters of nodes. 
Hughes 91  
This suggests that there were many, varying sources of information, and not necessarily any 
shared reality or truth. 
 
 
By my measure, Orlando had the most shared information by far, and both Left and Right 
participated equally. This suggests that though there were competing frames in Orlando, the 
Right and Left were interacting and sharing similar information, similar realities, and a similar 
truth, contributing to Orlando’s lack of polarization. 
 
 
However, this presupposes that most individual urls contain new or opposing information. 
Different urls do not necessarily suggest multiple truths or realities. Rather, a url could offer the 
same facts and information framed the same way as many other urls. Measuring information 
sharing through url shares has limitations, for it overestimates the number of opposing realities. 
Perhaps the majority of urls gave the same information after a shooting, or perhaps they gave 
contradicting information. For the next iteration, I hope to restructure the information sharing 




Vegas and Charleston were deeply polarized by my measure. As a reminder, I operationalize 
polarization by measuring the frequency of url shares within or across groups. Shares 
predominantly in one cluster suggests polarization, shares outside of the cluster suggest 
depolarization. Group polarization in political discourse leads to gridlock, groups falling more 
into their views, and pushing towards the extreme. Orlando, however, was not deeply polarized 
on the network graph. Yet, the opposing frames presented by the Left and Right would suggest 
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deep polarization. My network graphs do not represent interaction, but shared information and 
a shared reality. It does not suggest that they depolarize through interaction, but through some 
shared truth. One characteristic of group polarization is the groups believing in different facts. 
So, perhaps to believe in the same facts but to argue them differently and to use different 
frames is a step towards depolarization. This suggests that shared urls do not claim any 
ideological bridge was built, but rather reality is shared. 
 
 
Interaction across party lines in Orlando was regular, and information shared between the Right 
and Left. But why? I offer two possible explanations: 
1) Because Orlando was during the presidential election, the Right and Left were already 
interacting with each other more often. 
2) The Right and Left depolarize when there is a larger, outside perceived threat to unite 
against. 
Unfortunately, because of the few case studies I look at and the methods I use, I am unable to 
offer an answer with certainty. If the first were true, this study would show that during 




However, if the second were to be true, perhaps new and intentional frames of mass shootings 
could effectively decrease polarization after the event. For example, Terrorism has a deep, 
political history in the US tied tightly to media. In the US, Terrorism has become equated to 
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Islamic Terrorism and is deeply feared, for with each attack America as a whole is victimized. 
Each individual is attacked. However, with mass shootings perpetrated by “lone wolfs”, no such 
frame exists. Rather, it is a tragedy that is unlikely to be a recurring threat, for the man dies or 
goes to jain. To alter the mass shooting frame so that each American is a victim that will be 
threatened by this in the future(i.e. Parkland: March for Our Lives), the same emotion and 
political participation would be seen on Twitter in instances like Charleston or Vegas as they 





Because I looked at only three case studies with radically different frames, it is difficult to 
recognize patterns across the shootings, for the factors that came into play were different with 
each case. For example, the fact that Orlando was during the 2016 presidential campaigns could 
have made the tweets much more political than they would have been had it been outside of 
election season. Furthermore, Charleston had only 9 deaths, while Vegas had 58. If the number 
of deaths influences the volume or politicization of tweets, it would skew the results. Though 
these case studies were chosen by design for their differences, measures could be taken to 
improve the method. 
 
 
In order to more accurately recognize if the frame of the event correlates with the polarization, 
we would need to compare shootings that were as similar as possible in all other regards. A good 
example of this method is Aysel Morin who compares the DC Navy Yard Shooting with the Ft. 
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Hood Shooting and could conclude that the demographic of the shooter influences the frame.104 
With more shootings, I would be able to draw more substantial conclusions. 
 
Operalization of Polarization and Information Sharing 
 
As I have suggested above, operalization of information shares through url shares can 
overestimate the number of shared, for not all urls show different information from one another. 
However, I do stand behind operalization of polarization as url shares. Though url shares do not 
necessitate interaction between users, it suggests that those users have a common belief or view. 
Perhaps more subtle than a retweet or reply, observing url shares could look at how often people 
respected or found valuable the same information online across parties. 
 
 
We see through my measure of Orlando’s depolarization, that when there is a perceived external 
threat larger than the US political divide, a threat to both the Left and Right, interaction and 
depolarization could occur. Perhaps this could apply to focusing events and highly polarized 
issues more broadly. By changing the opposition each group is defined by from the opposing 
political party to some external, greater threat, my observations suggest that polarization would 
decrease as it did in Orlando. Therefore, one powerful way to decrease polarization is to alter the 
frame to mirror that of the War on Terror, but with Guns or mass violence. To make America as 
a whole a single, collective victim could allow a break in grid-lock to solve a problem that leads 






104 Morin, “Framing Terror.” 
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Cynthia Hurd, 54 
 
Rev. Clementa Pinckney, 41 
Tywanza Sanders, 26  
Sharonda Singleton, 45 
Rev. DePayne Middleton-Doctor, 49 
Rev. Daniel Simmons, 74 
Susan Jackson, 87  
Ethel Lance, 70  
Myra Thompson, 59 
 
Orlando 
Stanley Almodovar III, 23 
Amanda L. Alvear, 25 
Oscar A. Aracena Montero, 26 
Rodolfo Ayala Ayala, 33 
Antonio Davon Brown, 29 
Darryl Roman Burt II, 29 
Angel Candelario-Padro, 28 
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Juan Chavez Martinez, 25 
Luis Daniel Conde, 39 
Cory James Connell, 21 
Tevin Eugene Crosby, 25 
Deonka Deidra Drayton, 32 
Simón Adrian Carrillo Fernández, 31 
Leroy Valentin Fernandez, 25 
Mercedez Marisol Flores, 26 
Peter Ommy Gonzalez Cruz, 22 
Juan Ramon Guerrero, 22 
Paul Terrell Henry, 41 
Frank Hernandez, 27 
Miguel Angel Honorato, 30 
Javier Jorge Reyes, 40 
Jason Benjamin Josaphat, 19 
Eddie Jamoldroy Justice, 30 
Anthony Luis Laureano Disla, 25 
Christopher Andrew Leinonen, 32 
Alejandro Barrios Martinez, 21 
Brenda Marquez McCool, 49 
Gilberto R. Silva Menendez, 25 
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Kimberly Jean Morris, 37 
Akyra Monet Murray, 18 
Luis Omar Ocasio Capo, 20 
Geraldo A. Ortiz Jimenez, 25 
Eric Ivan Ortiz-Rivera, 36 
Joel Rayon Paniagua, 32 
Jean Carlos Mendez Perez, 35 
Enrique L. Rios, Jr., 25 
Jean Carlos Nieves Rodríguez, 27 
Xavier Emmanuel Serrano-Rosado, 35 
Christopher Joseph Sanfeliz, 24 
Yilmary Rodríguez Solivan, 24 
Edward Sotomayor Jr., 34 
Shane Evan Tomlinson, 33 
Martin Benitez Torres, 33 
Jonathan A. Camuy Vega, 24 
Juan Pablo Rivera Velázquez, 37 
Luis Sergio Vielma, 22 
Franky Jimmy DeJesus Velázquez, 50 
Luis Daniel Wilson-Leon, 37 
Jerald Arthur Wright, 31 
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Las Vegas 
Hannah Lassette Ahlers, 34 
Heather Lorraine Alvarado, 35 
Dorene Anderson, 49 
Carrie Rae Barnette, 34 
Jack Reginald Beaton, 54 
Stephen Richard Berger, 44 
Candice Ryan Bowers, 40 
Denise Burditus, 50 
Sandra Casey, 34 
 
Andrea Lee Anna Castilla, 28 
Denise Cohen, 58 
Austin William Davis, 29 
Thomas Day, Jr., 54 
Christiana Duarte, 22 
Stacee Ann Etcheber, 50 
Brian S Fraser, 39 
Keri Galvan, 31 
 
Dana Leann Gardner, 52 
Angela C Gomez, 20 
Rocio Guillen, 40 
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Charleston Hartfield, 34, 
 
Christopher Hazencomb, 44 
Jennifer Topaz Irvine, 42 
Teresa Nicol Kimura, 38 
Jessica Klymchuk, 34 
Carly Anne Kreibaum, 34 
Rhonda M LeRocque, 42 
Victor L Link, 55 
Jordan McIldoon, 24 
 
Kelsey Breanne Meadows, 28 
Calla-Marie Medig, 28 
James Melton, 29 
 
Patricia Mestas, 67 
Austin Cooper Meyer, 24 
Adrian Allan Murfitt, 35 
Rachael Kathleen Parker, 33 
Jennifer Parks, 36 
Carolyn Lee Parsons, 31 
Lisa Marie Patterson, 46 
John Joseph Phippen, 56 
Melissa V Ramirez, 26 
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Jordyn N Rivera, 21 
Quinton Robbins, 20 
Cameron Robinson, 28 
Tara Ann Roe, 34 
Lisa Romero-Muniz, 48 
Christopher Louis Roybal, 28 
Brett Schwanbeck, 61 
Bailey Schweitzer, 20 
Laura Anne Shipp, 50 
Erick Silva, 21 
Susan Smith, 53 
Brennan Lee Stewart, 30 
Derrick Dean Taylor, 56 
Neysa C Tonks, 46 
Michelle Vo, 32 
Kurt Allen Von Tillow, 55 
William W Wolfe, Jr., 42 
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